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The recent, crisp articulation of ‘Non-Intrinsic Egalitarianism’ emerged out of the critique 
of the influential distinction between ‘Telic’ and ‘Deontic’ egalitarianisms. Part of the 
promise of this approach is that it can be deployed in order to reintegrate these recent 
philosophical debates about equality with much older currents in the history of political 
thought. The paper explains how the century of argument in England and France after 1650 
created the intellectual space for the kind of presentation of Non-Intrinsic Egalitarian ideas 
such as we find in Rousseau’s major political writings from the 1750s and afterwards. In so 
doing, the paper illustrates the striking extent to which fundamental political-theoretical 
disagreements are often driven not so much by competing normative commitments as by 
divergent understandings of how those commitments ramify through the sociological and 
institutional possibilities that disputants imagine are plausibly open to them. 
 
 





The debates about equality that have loomed so large in recent academic liberal 
political theory, at least since the publication of Ronald Dworkin’s pair of articles on ‘What 
is Equality’ (Dworkin 1981a, 1981b) have been remarkable for their degree of analytical 
and philosophical sophistication on the one hand, and for their relative lack of reference to 
the history of political thought on the other. One reason for this lack of attention to 
previous reflection on the subject is methodological. Those who participate in these 
debates like to test philosophical principles against what they call their ‘intuitions’, often 
through the construction of elaborate thought experiments, with the goal (as it is 
sometimes described) of reaching ‘reflective equilibrium’, or a state in which intuitions and 
principles harmonize and provide mutual support for each other.1 This is a method that can 
be learned and practiced by those who are largely ignorant of the history of reflection on 
whatever the particular topic to hand happens to be; and, indeed, this is one reason why 
this style of philosophy lends itself well to undergraduate teaching, since students can jump 
straight into a trolley problem, or a description of some kind of ‘original position’, or an 
auction involving clamshells, without having to absorb much political philosophy before 
they can start to make sense—or start to think that they can make sense, at any rate—of 
                                                 
1 John Rawls coined the term ‘reflective equilibrium’, although he is careful to talk about 
what he calls ‘considered judgments’ and ‘considered judgments duly pruned’, in place of 
the language of ‘intuitions’. See Rawls 1972, 20. 
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what’s going on.2 
There may, however, be a more interesting reason as to why reference to historical 
arguments have played such a slight role in the recent debates about equality. Jeremy 
Waldron once observed that ‘Dworkin’s distinctive contribution has been to insist that it is 
not enough for the egalitarian to “come up with” an answer. It has to be a defensible 
answer; indeed, it has to be an answer that can be defended on egalitarian grounds’ 
(Waldron 2001, reviewing Dworkin 2000). Central to the recent debate, then, has been a 
concern to treat equality as a distinctive moral value, rather than as any kind of 
instrumental value pressed into the service of more fundamental values, such as liberty or 
the maximization of utility. Those contemporary egalitarians who want to insist on the 
non-derivative character of their commitment to equality, then, may very well find that the 
resources of the tradition of Western political philosophy are not especially helpful, and so 
they are frequently ignored. For if we are convinced that equality is to be valued primarily 
for non-instrumental purposes, then the history of political thought can be confusing 
terrain, very crudely because those discourses that have been organized around some kind 
of claim about the fundamental value of equality have tended in practice to endorse, or at 
least not decisively to oppose, what appear to us to be highly inegalitarian politics. By 
contrast, the richest accounts of the goodness of equality and, in particular, of the badness 
of inequality that we possess in the tradition have tended not to insist on the fundamental, 
non-derivative, or non-instrumental character of that equality.  
So: those historic discourses that have been organized around a claim about the 
                                                 
2 For critical discussion of such methods in ethics, together with a dose of skepticism that 
these ‘neo-Kantian’ methods have much to do with Kant, see Wood 2008, 43-54. 
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equality of human beings—whether Christian religion, Stoic philosophy, Roman law, and, 
more recently, modern natural rights theory—have all been highly ambivalent in practice 
about slavery, with all four presenting claims either about why slavery doesn’t really 
matter, or about how certain kinds of slavery might in practice be compatible with a 
teaching of formal human equality. Examples of the former would include those claims 
about how in Christ there is no slave and free (Galatians 3:28, 1 Corinthians 12:13, 
Colossians 3:11; cf. Philemon 1:12, Ephesians 6:5, 1 Timothy 6:1-3) or the Stoics’ insistence 
that what matters in life is the freedom of the mind rather than the body, as the mind is 
something that is always in our own power, in a way that the external world, which 
includes the physical movements of our own limbs, is not (e.g., Manual 1—and cf. 14—in 
Epictetus 1989). Examples of the latter might be the large body of Roman law dealing with 
slavery (Institutes, 1.3.2 in Birks, McLeod, and Krueger 1987; and Digest, 1.5.4.1 and 
12.6.64 in Mommsen, Krueger, and Watson 1985; Buckland 1908), or the way in which the 
modern natural rights theory—arguably the forerunner of our current doctrine of human 
rights—was invented in the seventeenth century in part in order to provide new 
justifications of slavery to replace the older Aristotelian arguments which no longer 
seemed so convincing in the face of the kinds of skepticism articulated by Montaigne (and 
others) and of what we used to call the scientific revolution. John Locke’s arguments about 
slavery in the Second Treatise of Civil Government are probably the best-known examples 
of these, but generally analogous passages can be dug out of Grotius, Hobbes, Pufendorf, 
and the rest (Locke 1988, 283-5; Grotius 2005, 1360-73; Hobbes 1994, 126-9; 1998, ch. 8, 
102-6; 1991, 141-2; Pufendorf 1991, 129-31; see also Pateman 1988, 39-76). 
On the other hand, when writers in the tradition do write about the goodness of 
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equality or the badness of inequality, as I have indicated, it is often unclear that equality is 
playing any kind of fundamental or non-instrumental role. Take just the two names 
mentioned in the title of this paper, for example. Thomas Hobbes argued that the natural 
law teaches that each must acknowledge each other as an equal, but the natural law is a set 
of precepts organized around delivering the goal of civil peace, and all the values it 
espouses are strictly instrumental to that end. Jean-Jacques Rousseau is probably the most 
important political philosopher of equality of them all, his Discourse on the Origin of 
Inequality, still the key text addressing the topic in typical university courses on the history 
of modern political thought, but even Rousseau is explicit in his Social Contract that the 
varieties of political, social, and economic equality he prescribes are so prescribed in virtue 
of the fact that they are, on his view, necessary conditions for being able to live in security 
and freedom, rather than because they are somehow independently valuable in their own 
right (Rousseau 1997b, 78). 
I turn now to ‘What Should Egalitarians Believe?’, an article by Martin O’Neill from 
the 2008 volume of Philosophy & Public Affairs. O’Neill offers, to my mind, the most 
significant political-philosophical response to what has been the most significant individual 
contribution to the debate on equality since Dworkin. That is to say, he has taken aim at a 
central distinction that has structured so many of the treatments of equality over the last 
quarter century or so, which is that between ‘telic’ and ‘deontic’ egalitarianism, as 
presented by Derek Parfit in his well-known 1991 Lindley Lecture at the University of 
Kansas, ‘Equality or Priority’ (O’Neill 2008, Parfit 1995, 1997). Teleological, or ‘telic’, 
egalitarians accept what he calls ‘the principle of equality’ and believe that ‘it is in itself bad 
if some people are worse off than others’ (Parfit 1997, 204). These are to be distinguished 
 5 
 
from those he calls ‘deontic’ egalitarians, who believe that although ‘we should sometimes 
aim for equality, that is not because we would thereby make the outcome better’ (207). For 
deontic egalitarians, inequality is not bad, but it is unjust. 
According to O’Neill, however, we’re not in Kansas anymore. ‘In its most attractive 
versions’, he maintains, ‘egalitarianism is neither Telic nor Deontic’, but some variety of 
what he calls ‘Non-Intrinsic Egalitarianism’ (O’Neill 2008, 121). Non-Intrinsic Egalitarians 
object to distributive inequalities insofar as they create stigmatizing differences in status; 
lead to the domination of one part of society by the rest; weaken self-respect, especially 
that of the worst-off; create servility and deferential behavior; and undermine healthy 
fraternal social relations and attitudes (121-3). From the standpoint of Non-Intrinsic 
Egalitarianism, Telic egalitarianism appears ‘extravagant and undermotivated’ (123), 
insofar as it fails to illuminate why it is in itself bad for inequality to exist or to persist in 
society; while Deontic egalitarianism can also be rejected, insofar as Deontic egalitarians 
invoke ‘some other moral reason’ (124), such as justice, to explain why inequalities should 
be reduced or eliminated. For Non-Intrinsic Egalitarians, by contrast, the inequalities we 
seek to reduce or eliminate are picked out not because it is intrinsically bad that they exist, 
but rather because of the pernicious consequences of letting them persist in terms of 
stigma, domination, or servility. But this isn’t a simple instrumentalist story, in which we 
promote various equalisation measures in pursuit of some other, deeper moral or political 
value. Rather, the moral reasons we invoke in defense of a project of inequality-reduction 
aren’t fully separable from an appreciation of the value of equality itself, involving 
reference to what O’Neill calls a ‘complex background picture of how people should live 
together as equals’ (125). In particular, the harms that Non-Intrinsic Egalitarianism seeks 
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to obviate relate in one way to another to an idea of self-respect which is ‘itself a 
distinctively egalitarian idea: it is the idea of one’s self-conception as an efficacious and 
undominated agent…enjoying an equality of standing with others’ (128). That O’Neill’s 
intervention has been a generative one can be seen in terms of its reception. Jubb, for 
example, has shown in this journal (2015) how O’Neill’s perspective can fruitfully 
contribute to the ‘realist’ agenda in contemporary political theory. 
I find the ways in which O’Neill articulates Non-Intrinsic Egalitarianism to be 
politically attractive and intellectually persuasive. But his essay is also notable insofar as it 
holds out a promise that we might be able to reintegrate to some extent the contemporary 
debates about equality among political philosophers with the history of pre-1981 political 
thought. O’Neill himself is alert to this. He notes that the concerns of Non-Intrinsic 
Egalitarians are the ‘dominant themes in the history of egalitarian thought, at least since 
Rousseau’ (129), and he identifies Non-Intrinsic Egalitarianism as ‘itself a Rousseauvian 
position’ (129, n. 28). What I seek to do in the rest of this paper, then, is to try to explain 
why Non-Intrinsic Egalitarianism came to be such a central element of Rousseau’s political 
theory; or, perhaps better, how the previous century of argument on related themes in 
England and France created the intellectual space by the middle of the eighteenth century 
for the kind of presentation of Non-Intrinsic Egalitarian ideas such as we find in Rousseau’s 






Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) has appeared to many readers to be some kind of 
egalitarian, but we need to acknowledge from the outset that his thinking about equality is 
complex (Hoekstra 2012). The ninth law of nature might teach each man to acknowledge 
every other as his equal (Hobbes 1991, 107), but this is not because equality is 
unambiguously a good thing. Indeed, the state of nature is a state of war in large part 
because of some of the equalities that obtain there. The famous chapter in Leviathan on the 
state of nature announces the theme immediately, beginning with the words, ‘Nature hath 
made men so equall…’ (86), with Hobbes going on to single out as particularly important 
the way in which from an ‘equality of ability, ariseth equality of hope in the attaining of our 
Ends’ (87). While in the civil condition the citizens may stand in a certain kind of 
relationship of equality vis-à-vis one another, that civil society itself is constructed around, 
even constituted by, an awesome inequality between the subjects and the sovereign. The 
theoretical heart of Hobbes’s concern with equality, however, is clear enough. Since it is 
men’s pride together with their propensity to make really bad judgments that makes 
peaceable living impossible in the state of nature, the task of political philosophy is to find a 
way of defusing this explosive combination. Much of Hobbes’s political theory involves 
secularizing religious claims, and this part of it is no exception. In place of the traditional 
Augustinian condemnation of pride as an offense against God (Augustine 1998, 608), 
Hobbes transforms pride into an offense against human equality, and close to the core of 
his argument is a claim that we must acknowledge one another as equals, in order to make 
possible the kind of political institutions and practices that will bring an end to the violence 
of the proud. Indeed, Hobbes insists that we must make this acknowledgment of equality 
even if we are not in fact equal to each other, in whatever sense we might happen to think 
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relevant (Hobbes 1991, 107; Hoekstra 2012, esp. 104-5). The centrality of pride in 
Hobbes’s argument is even indicated in his book’s title, for Leviathan is described in the 
book of Job in these terms: ‘Upon earth there is not his like, who is made without fear. He 
beholdeth all high things: he is a king over all the children of pride’ (Job 41:33-4). When 
Hobbes turns to explain his choice of title at the end of chapter 28, furthermore, he flags the 
theme explicitly again just before he introduces his Biblical sea-monster with a remark 
about how it is man’s ‘Pride and other Passions’ that ‘have compelled him to submit himself 
to Government’ (Hobbes 1991, 220-21). 
So far, so straightforward. But what might Hobbesian civil society be like in 
practice? On the most usual view of the matter—which I shall call the Orthodox view—our 
passions remain the same as they were in the state of nature, but the new artificial 
institutions that structure our lives ensure that the passions that helped to generate 
violence in the state of nature no longer issue in behavior destructive either to ourselves or 
to others. First and foremost, the state provides the kind of effective law enforcement that 
creates overwhelming incentives for us not to assault our fellow citizens. But also, and 
more interestingly, perhaps, our passions to dominate or to glory over others find an outlet 
in everyday activities that don’t tend to threaten the fabric of society. Some of us enter 
reality TV shows or take part in competitive sports and games. Others try to write the Great 
American Novel, or submit their scholarly articles for publication in Philosophy & Public 
Affairs and other leading journals of egalitarian political philosophy. And it may be that 
economic activity is like this, too. One of the problems of the state of nature is that we can’t 
there enjoy what Hobbes calls ‘commodious living’ (Hobbes 1991, 90). But in civil society, 
instead of violently subjugating one another, we can work to accumulate wealth in order to 
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have a bigger house, or a faster car, or a snappier wardrobe than those of our fellow 
citizens, and we take a certain pleasure in the relative superiority that we enjoy in these 
regards. 
This is not obviously an egalitarian vision of society. Martin O’Neill uses the label 
‘Weak Egalitarianism’, in contrast to full-blown ‘Non-Intrinsic Egalitarianism’ (which is 
‘Strong’), for when we are concerned to reduce distributive inequalities, but not for a 
distinctively egalitarian reason (O’Neill 2008, 124-5), and we might note that Hobbes on 
this Orthodox view does not even meet that threshold, for as I have described things there 
is no particular concern to reduce the distributive inequalities that are generated through 
the various practices and institutions of the civil society, so long as that society is able to 
regulate its affairs without violence. Indeed, the point of permitting or even encouraging 
social and economic inequality on this view might be precisely to avoid such violence; the 
inequalities may be functional for the preservation of peace by satiating the yearnings of 
the proud.  
 There is more to be said on this subject, however, than simply stating what I’ve 
called the Orthodox view. Just as Hegel’s philosophy naturally lent itself to ‘Left’ and ‘Right’ 
variations, so too we should not be surprised to find something analogous going on in the 
case of Hobbes.  István Hont, for example, has argued for a contrast between the Hobbes of 
De Cive, who was ‘relatively relaxed about economic activity’, with taxation to cover 
military defense, but for whom ‘most private trading activity fell under the rubric of 
innocent liberty’, and the Hobbes of Leviathan for whom ‘the regulatory regime was much 
more detailed and rigid’ (Hont 2005, 45), with sumptuary laws, the regulation of trade, 
suspicion of the activities of the very wealthy, state provision for those unable to provide 
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for themselves, and so on, in short, some of the pillars of what we might today call a 
broadly egalitarian social democratic welfare state. If such measures systematically worked 
to reduce economic inequality, we would then have an instantiation of O’Neill’s ‘Weak 
Egalitarianism’. 
There is, furthermore, one interpretation of Hobbes in the current literature—let’s 
call it the Unorthodox view—which makes him into an even more substantively egalitarian, 
and perhaps even utopian theorist. On this view, which has been pressed by Richard Tuck, 
Hobbesian civil society doesn’t involve a redirection of our potentially destructive passions 
so much as a transformation of them. This view draws attention to the way that on 
Hobbes’s distinctive account of the passions, set out in each of the three main presentations 
of his political ideas, the emotions we experience are centrally bound up with the 
competitive struggle for survival in the state of nature, and they are all concerned with 
judgments of superiority and inferiority. As Tuck puts it, ‘Our entire emotional life, 
according to Hobbes, extraordinary as this might seem, is in fact a complicated set of beliefs 
about the best way of securing ourselves against our fellow men, with all the familiar 
complexities of love, pride, and laughter in the end reducible simply to a set of ideas about 
our own relative safety from other people’s power’ (2004, 132). In the well-founded 
commonwealth, then, on the one hand, the daily struggle for existence is no longer a 
pressing concern; and, on the other hand, the institution of the sovereign settles once and 
for all the question of who is to enjoy precedency over the rest. The result of these two 
developments is a transformation of our emotional lives, with the prideful passions of 
glorying and vainglorying fading away, to be replaced by—well, maybe by not very much at 
all. In the civil state we are finally able to live according to the laws of nature, 
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acknowledging equality, behaving charitably, showing gratitude, and avoiding the 
expression of insult and contempt towards our fellow citizens. But note that even this 
interpretation of Hobbes does not transform him into a ‘Strong’ or Non-Intrinsic Egalitarian 
in O’Neill’s terms, and that however much this utopian view of Leviathan might concern 
itself with the avoidance of stigmatizing differences in status, of unequal power 
relationships, or of expressions of contempt that injure the self-respect of weaker members 
of society, it remains a version of what O’Neill calls ‘Weak Egalitarianism’, insofar as the 
equalities that obtain are still straightforwardly the consequence of a politics of preventing 




Although Hobbes’s claims about equality were attacked by his conservative, 
patriarchalist critics (e.g., Clarendon 1676, 32-3, or Coke 1660, 26, quoted in Parkin 2007, 
230), other writers in the modern natural law tradition retained some kind of claim about 
equality at the heart of their theories, too. I’m not going to address any of John Locke’s 
arguments here. His egalitarianism is complicated, but seems to me to lean more towards 
what we might call Intrinsic Egalitarianism, in contrast to the Non-Intrinsic variety under 
consideration here. (For relevant discussion of Locke see especially Waldron 2002.) I do, 
however, want to say something about Samuel Pufendorf (1632-1694), who was far more 
influential in his own day than he is in ours—whereas in the case of Locke, it is other way 
around, more or less, at least with regard to the kind of arguments I’m considering here. 
Pufendorf can be located as a component part of the process that Jon Parkin has called 
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‘taming the Leviathan’ (2007), through which the more radical, subversive, or disturbing 
aspects of Hobbes’s argument could be smoothed away as his theory was revised and 
incorporated into an invented tradition of modern natural law that could be safely 
propounded in the universities. What’s striking about Pufendorf’s presentation for present 
purposes is the way in which he can repeat some of Hobbes’s foundational egalitarian 
moves that underpin something like what I’ve called the Orthodox view, but then works to 
spin out from them an even more overtly inegalitarian vision of modern society than 
anything we find in Hobbes. 
So: Pufendorf’s theory has a Hobbesian core. Men might be naturally unequal with 
respect to their various physical and mental attributes, and yet he demands (as the title of 
book 3, chapter 2 of The Law of Nature and Nations has it), ‘That all Men are to be 
accounted by Nature equal’ (cf. Viroli 1988, 66). Here are some of his words: ‘Since then 
human Nature agrees equally to all Persons, and since no one can live a sociable Life with 
another, who does not own and respect him as a Man; it follows as a Command of the Law 
of Nature, that every Man should esteem, and treat another as one who is naturally his 
Equal, or who is a Man as well as he’ (Pufendorf 1749, 224). But although this part of the 
natural law is framed in broadly egalitarian terms, Pufendorf strongly resisted any further 
moves in the direction of substantive social or economic equality. ‘[D]isparity of Riches 
does not of itself cause any Inequality3 amongst Fellow-Subjects’, he declared, and there is 
‘nothing in this Civil Inequality any ways repugnant to those Precepts, which we have 
                                                 
3 The printed text here has ‘Equality’, but this must be a typographical error, and it is 
corrected in a centuries-old hand in the edition I consulted (the British Library copy 
available through ECCO).  
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before deduced from a natural Equality (1749, 232). And in his discussion of price and 
esteem, for example, he quoted, paraphrased and registered his disagreement with 
Hobbes’s own discussion of what it is to honor someone (e.g. in ch. 10 of Hobbes 1991), 
and included this remark: 
And as the chief Reason why a Price was set upon Things, was, that when they were 
to be exchanged or removed from one Person to another, they might be the better 
compared with one another; so the End intended by Esteem, is, that we may be able 
to form a Comparison between Men, by setting, as it were, a Value upon them, and, 
in Consequence, establish a becoming Order and Distance between them, whenever 
they should happen to be united; it evidently appearing, that nothing was more 
absolutely inconsistent with the Convenience of Life, than an universal Equality 
(Pufendorf 1749, 800).4 
This last remark, in fact, points towards what is one of the most substantial 
theoretical disagreements between Hobbes and Pufendorf. For Hobbes, honor was mostly a 
troublesome business, driving men to seek precedence over one another and, above all, to 
avoid losing face. Hence ‘glory’, closely related to honor in Hobbes’s typology of the 
                                                 
4 The ensuing discussion of esteem is then structured around a distinction between ‘simple 
esteem’, which is what all citizens owe one another, as long as they do not violate basic 
norms of sociability or non-criminality, and ‘intensive esteem’, which is how they make the 
kind of discriminations described in this passage in the civil state. This passage is discussed 
by Viroli 1988, 81, though the interpretation of the relationships that hold between Hobbes 
and Pufendorf and between Pufendorf and Rousseau are different to the ones presented 
here, for which I am indebted to Richard Tuck. 
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passions, was one of the causes of war in the state of nature. Honor and esteem were far 
less troubling for Pufendorf, however, as any tendency that practices of honoring and 
esteeming others might have towards fomenting conflict in the state of nature was more 
than balanced by a second, utilitarian tendency, which fostered a certain kind of sociability 
among men even in the state of nature. Men might not have had a straightforwardly natural 
instinct or propensity to be sociable, on Pufendorf’s view, but in the state of nature they 
were weak and needy, and this aspect of their condition drove them to engage in exchange, 
commerce, trade with one another, all for the sake of utility. We might say, if we like this 
kind of language, that where the state of nature was more like a zero-sum game on 
Hobbes’s account, it was, with reciprocal exchange, a positive-sum game as far as Pufendorf 
was concerned. This ‘commercial sociability’, to use István Hont’s jargon (e.g. 2005, 40-41), 
was not the foundation of the state—as we might think that it was for Aristotle, for whom 
the polis originated in the bare needs of life, even if it continued in existence for the sake of 
a good life (1988, 1252b30)—but it was the foundation of a very influential account of non-
political society. Indeed, this distinctive theorization of sociability, or, in Latin, socialitas, 
led to Pufendorf’s followers being known as the ‘socialists’ or socialisti in seventeenth- and 
eighteenth-century Germany (on which see Hont 2005, 159-60 n. 1). 
 
The Augustinians: Pierre Nicole and François de Fénelon 
 
Just as the resources of the modern natural law tradition could be deployed in the 
service of a range of arguments, from what I’ve called the Unorthodox view of Hobbes 
through to the much more inegalitarian approach of Pufendorffian commercial sociability, 
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seventeenth-century Augustinianism (here fairly broadly construed) was another 
discourse that could generate sharply-competing economic orientations. Pierre Nicole 
(1625-1695), for example, who belonged to the group of dissident Catholic ultra-
Augustinians known as the Jansenists, developed an argument that could look strikingly 
like Pufendorf’s, even though it was built on very different theoretical foundations. A very 
different kind of Augustinian, François de Salignac de la Mothe-Fénelon (1651-1715), 
Archbishop of Cambrai and anti-Jansenist, provided an argument which has some affinities 
with a more egalitarian interpretation of Hobbes. 
Augustinians teach that after the Fall of Man, humans are doomed to sin in the 
absence of divine grace, i.e., to act on morally base motives. These were generally grouped 
together under the general heading of ‘concupiscence’, but concerning which Nicole came 
to deploy a slightly different vocabulary, that of ‘amour-propre’, or self-love (1696). 
Although it was sinful to act on the promptings of our self-love, Nicole argued that divine 
Providence ensured that, when we did so, society remained just as orderly and prosperous 
as it would have been had we acted in accordance with the morally preferable motives of 
charity, understood as the disinterested love of God and one’s neighbor (1696; Parrish 
2007, 188-203). This being the case, we could never reliably infer from the observable 
consequences of our actions whether we had acted virtuously or not, whether we had in 
fact been the recipients of the kind of divine grace that would enable us to act 
meritoriously; and, further, any attempt to inspect our own psychological motivations in 
pursuit of an answer to this question would run into layer upon layer of self-deception. 
Right now, we see through a glass darkly; but on the day of judgment, we will understand 
the true nature of our actions clearly enough. 
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 For Nicole, the intercourse of self-interested agents mutually pleasuring one 
another—the sexual language is not at all out of place in this kind of Augustinian theory—
might be deplorable from the moral point of view; but, even as such a society generated 
unequal outcomes, so too the various ties of reciprocal self-interest supported rather than 
undermined a general social cohesion. In this, Nicole was fully in line with Pufendorf’s 
commercial sociability (on which see Hont 2005, 47-50). From one point of view, Nicole’s 
argument looks a bit like what I called the Orthodox view of Hobbes, involving a claim that 
things have been arranged in such a way that acting on prideful and other selfish passions 
turns out not to generate destructive conflict after all. But it isn’t quite the Orthodox view, 
insofar as it is God who has so arranged things, rather than the ‘mortall God’, the Leviathan 
sovereign. If it is God who ensures these outcomes, then we might reflect that the central 
Hobbesian problem of the state of nature isn’t really a problem at all, and the aggregated 
self-interested actions of men don’t contribute towards making life solitary, poor, nasty, 
brutish, or short. There are certainly conspicuously Hobbesian elements in Nicole’s theory: 
a Fallen account of human nature, and, as it happens, a staunch defence of absolutism in 
politics; but we might reflect that it’s actually a pretty non-Hobbesian social theory doing 
the heavy lifting. 
 We get a very different kind of account from a very different kind of Augustinian. ‘As 
arbitrary power is the bane of kings’, Fénelon wrote in Telemachus, his sharp attack on the 
economic and military policy of Louis XIV, ‘so luxury poisons a whole nation’ (Fénelon 
1994, 294). In words that still resonate, ‘All live above their rank and income, some from 
vanity and ostentation, and to display their wealth; others from false shame, and to hide 
their poverty’ (297). Fénelon argued that running an economy devoted to the production 
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and consumption of luxury goods made war more likely, as those without access to luxury 
goods were tempted to use violence to acquire them, and it made that war more dangerous, 
because ‘these superfluities enervate, intoxicate and torment those who possess them’ 
(110), making them less able to fight (134). Hobbes and Augustine might not have agreed 
about much, but they both thought that the goal of politics was the earthly peace. Fénelon’s 
charge was that any kind of Hobbesian state that permitted luxury threatened therefore to 
fail in its own terms. Far from the Jansenists’ darkly ironic celebration of the web of the 
world market, Fénelon advocated the state’s reconstruction of the entire economic sphere. 
His ideal modern state was presented towards the end of Telemachus, with his description 
of the city of Salente after it had been reorganized by Telemachus’s tutor Mentor, who was 
actually Minerva, the goddess of wisdom, in disguise. Reformed Salente is mostly made up 
of farmers, with the profits from agriculture spent not on luxuries but on domestically-
manufactured armaments, in order to deter foreign aggression (160-72, 294-6). 
The claim is sometimes made that Fénelon was the originator of the Revolutionary 
slogan, ‘liberté, égalité, fraternité’ (on which see Quantin 1989). If the slogan does have 
anything to do with Fénelon, it probably owes to the description of the idyllic pastoral 
community at Bétique that he offers in Telemachus: ‘[T]hey love one another with a 
brotherly affection that nothing can trouble. It is to their contempt for vain riches and 
illusory pleasures that they are indebted for this union, peace, and liberty. They are all free 
and all equal’ (1994, 111). The components of the revolutionary triad are all here, to be 
sure, but it’s hard to resist the thought that the attempt to pin the slogan on a seventeenth-
century Archbishop is at bottom a piece of Catholic counter-revolutionary politics rather 
than anything else. For although Fénelon certainly was a cosmopolitan—one of the best-
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known cosmopolitans in the eighteenth century, in fact—he wasn’t much of an egalitarian 
at all. His disciple, the chevalier Ramsay (1686-1743), rejected the idea of natural equality 
in his statement of the foundations of political theory ‘according to the principles of the late 
archbishop of Cambray’ (Ramsay 1722, 30-35); and in Fénelon’s description of Reformed 
Salente, the concern was not to abolish the various social classes, or to equalize their living 
standards, but rather to make sure they didn’t interact with one another in ways that 
generated discontent and civil strife. Egalitarian social relations might indeed be feasible in 
primitive, idyllic Bétique, but not for post-luxury Salente. Fénelon was not a Hobbist—
indeed, Ramsay correctly insisted that his political theory had been directed against both 
Hobbes and Machiavelli (among others). But if the theoretical basis of the argument is 
quite different, we can, nevertheless observe certain commonalities between the 
institutional and economic superstructures of the more egalitarian interpretations of 
Hobbes and Fénelonian monarchy, with their depictions of an absolute monarch 
comprehensively structuring social and economic life in order to produce a frugal, 




 Following in Fénelon’s footsteps, Charles-Louis de Secondat, baron de La Brède et de 
Montesquieu (1689-1755) was also troubled by the trajectory of the absolutist monarchy 
in France. Fénelon had written that the monarch had to learn how to ‘slacken the bow of 
power’, and this might be a useful way in to Montesquieu’s political thought, too (Fénelon 
1994, 297). But the argument that he set out in his various writings, culminating in The 
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Spirit of the Laws, represented a distinct alternative to the politics of Fénelonian reform. 
On the one hand, Montesquieu rejected the anti-commercial politics of Fénelon’s Reformed 
Salente. There was no good reason why a modern society should not seek to be a wealthy 
society, and Montesquieu did not share Fénelon’s anxieties about the tendency of luxury to 
generate international conflict (Hont 2006, 404-409). But on the other hand, although 
Montesquieu found much to agree with in Bernard Mandeville’s account of modern social 
and economic life as presented in The Fable of the Bees (Mandeville 1924), he could not 
straightforwardly endorse Mandeville’s description of British politics and society, at least, 
not as a model for France. The English constitution had evolved in a remarkable way that 
preserved liberty amidst the furious clash of political parties and the bustle of commercial 
life, but Montesquieu thought that this happy outcome was the unintended consequence of 
England’s idiosyncratic, violent and unstable political development in the seventeenth 
century, but not one that could be deliberately copied by its neighbor (on which see, e.g. 
Sonenscher 2007, 41-52).  
 In place of Fénelonian monarchy, therefore, Montesquieu offered a new theorization 
of monarchy, in which the power of the monarch had to be limited in order for the liberty of 
the subjects to flourish. A new politics of inequality was absolutely central to this political 
vision. One chapter title early in The Spirit of the Laws is pointedly called, ‘That virtue is 
not the principle of monarchical government’; rather, the principle of monarchy was honor, 
and, according to Montesquieu, the nature of honor ‘is to demand preferences and 
distinctions’ (Montesquieu 1989, 25, 27; for discussion see Krause 2002; cf. Brooke 2017). 
He freely conceded that there was no moral reason as to why aristocrats should receive any 
kind of preference, and that there was something false about honor, ‘but this false honor is 
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as useful to the public as the true one would be to the individuals who could have it’ 
(Montesquieu 1989, 27; see also Sonenscher 2007, 103-104). The trick about honor in a 
monarchical society was that an unintended aggregate by-product of the jealous 
safeguarding of privileges and distinctions at all ranks in society was the preservation and 
buttressing of all of the subjects’ liberties—which included the liberties to engage in 
commerce, thereby to become wealthy, thence to buy one’s way into the honorable ranks of 
the otherwise non-commercial aristocracy. 
 We might think that this kind of defense of the utility of inequality for politics 
required a theoretical rejection of the more egalitarian interpretations of Hobbes, and, 
indeed, it’s probably fair to say that Montesquieu is the most radically unHobbesian 
political theorist in the mainstream of the modern tradition. Montesquieu rejected pretty 
much the entirety of Hobbesian political theory, starting with the celebrated depiction of 
the state of nature. Where for Hobbes, it was certain equalities that obtained in the state of 
nature that made it a state of war, for Montesquieu, by contrast, the equality that prevails in 
a state of nature contributes to it being a peaceful state; but that, ‘As soon as men are in 
society, they lose their feeling of weakness, the equality that was among them ceases, and 
the state of war begins’ (Montesquieu 1989, 7). On the Unorthodox view of Hobbes, we are 
proud in nature, or in ill-constructed commonwealths, but in the well-founded state pride 
is effectively abolished. For Montesquieu, by contrast again, proud behavior is not natural 
but learned, far more at home in the social state than in the state of nature, and, as I’ve 
indicated, the politics of distinction, privilege and hierarchy were central to his conception 
of monarchy. Montesquieu dismantled Hobbes’s system into its component parts, and 
rearranged them in strikingly unHobbesian ways. Managing equality and fear correctly 
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were central elements of good Hobbesian politics; whereas Montesquieu drove a wedge 
between these two, organizing his account of democratic republicanism around the idea of 
virtue as the love of equality, and his account of despotism, the nightmare possible future 
for France, around his notion of fear, or ‘dread’ (crainte).5 
 Montesquieu was convinced that France had to be organized along thoroughly 
inegalitarian lines if her citizens were to prosper in freedom. But how then should we 
characterize the egalitarianism of the democratic republics that he also theorized, whose 
animating principle was virtue, specifically understood as a love of equality? Here I’ll draw 
on the words of Judith Shklar. ‘A tight, cohesive little society of mutually watchful citizens is 
essential to maintain democracy and its spirit of equality’, she wrote:  
Censors must reinforce these informal restrains upon the conduct of adults, but 
nothing is more important than the upbringing of the young, who must obey the old 
in rigidly patriarchal households… The accused criminal must be given the most 
extensive protection, for the life of every citizen is equally precious, but once a 
sentence has been passed, there can be no pardon… [There will be] [s]umptuary 
laws... Since women are treated as articles of consumption in these societies, their 
chastity and domestication are part of the frugal probity of an egalitarian republic. 
Because all relationships are public in a republic, male friendship is realized only 
there… This was Athens at its best and it haunted Montesquieu’s imagination 
(Shklar 1987, 77; also Montesquieu 1989, 104-11).  
The inequalities of status and rights that obtain between men and women prevent us late 
                                                 
5 For a comparison of Hobbes and Montesquieu on ‘fear’ and ‘crainte’, see the first two 
chapters of Robin 2004. 
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moderns considering this a Non-Intrinsic Egalitarian position, obviously enough. But, if we 
were to set gender aside, the logic of this position does seem to me to be Non-Intrinsically 
Egalitarian. Recall the key criteria, as O’Neill set them out. It is vital in Montesquieu’s 
democratic republic for the citizens to avoid stigmatizing differences in status and relations 
of domination. (Montesquieu would deny that the old dominate the young in any 
objectionable way, as this is just a matter of democratic taking turns across the life-cycle.) 
The love of equality that characterizes the republic is essential for the self-respect of all 
citizens, and warns them against servile relationships. And the remarks about male 
friendship remind us what a thoroughly gendered idea the ideal of fraternity—central to 
the politics of Non-Intrinsic Egalitarianism—in practice (almost?) always turns out to be. A 
Montesquieuian democrat would agree that Parfit’s ‘telic’ view of equality is ‘extravagant 
and undermotivated’, as O’Neill suggests; and the democratic republican’s concern for 
equality does not here grow out of a wider theory of justice, as the ‘deontic’ egalitarians 
tend to suggest, but is a distinctively political phenomenon specific to a particular regime-
type.  
 However interested Montesquieu was in describing the nature and structure of the 
democratic republic, this was not a state form he thought that moderns should try to 
create, or to recreate (De Dijn 2013). Modern Europe was not especially hospitable to small 
regimes, and Montesquieu insisted that his democratic republics had to be very small 
indeed, if relations of equality were to endure among the citizens. The Roman Republic 
became large, and that was its undoing—and the subject of Montesquieu’s second book 
(1999). Certainly, Montesquieu’s insistence on the small size of republics helped to create 
the terms of the debate that Jacob T. Levy has described (2006): Hume and the authors of 
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the Federalist are the best-known critics of the ‘small republic thesis’, and obviously these 
concerns deeply informed the constitutional deliberations at Philadelphia. But we might 
just note here that as the republic becomes larger, more representative and more 
commercial, the content of the equality that supposedly stands at its heart gets increasingly 
watered down into a civic ideal, or a bare claim of equality before the law, and it becomes 
hard to see quite how, say, Montesquieu’s ‘love of equality’ is doing any distinctive work in 
the argument any more. The continental, federal republic that James Madison and Thomas 
Jefferson helped to create, for example, was not a Non-Intrinsic Egalitarian one, and not just 




  What might we say about Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778), in light of the story 
that I’ve been setting out in this paper? First, the Non-Intrinsic Egalitarianism of Rousseau’s 
Social Contract and other writings on republican politics is obviously very closely modeled 
on Montesquieu’s democratic republic, complete with the features we might find 
obnoxious: mutual surveillance, the censorship of morals, strictly regulated consumption, 
and the exclusion of women from the political realm. (It will never do, by the way, to say 
that Rousseau was thoughtlessly sexist in the manner of so many of his contemporaries: he 
thought long and hard about gender indeed before coming to his various conclusions—on 
which see Rosenblatt 2002.) We should not be surprised by this. Rousseau might not quite 
have been Montesquieu’s disciple, but he was hugely impressed by and interested in The 
Spirit of the Laws. This was a book that he had read with great care, and from which he had 
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made very extensive notes, while working as a secretary for the Dupin household from the 
later 1740s—and this was also the period which was also his introduction to serious 
thinking about gender, for if M. Claude Dupin had him working on Montesquieu for a 
critical response that he was preparing (1750-51), Mme. Louise Dupin put him to work to 
assemble material for the history of women that she wanted to write (Cranston 1983: 204-
7, 213-15). 
Rousseau’s key disagreement with Montesquieu was presented in the section on 
politics in his educational novel, Emile. After dismissing Grotius as a ‘child of bad faith’ 
(‘enfant de mauvaise foi’), and Hobbes as someone who agreed with Grotius—‘their 
principles are exactly alike’ (‘leurs principes sont exactement semblables’)—he turned his 
attention to Montesquieu: 
The only modern in a position to create this great and useless science was the 
illustrious Montesquieu. But he was careful not to discuss the principles of political 
right. He was content to discuss the positive right of established governments, and 
nothing in the world is more different than these two studies. (Rousseau 1979, 458.) 
We might see Rousseau’s response to Montesquieu as having two central elements, 
represented by his two best-known political texts, the Discourse on the Origin of Inequality 
and the Social Contract. In the first (1997a, 111-222), Rousseau embraced the just-so story 
genre so popular in the eighteenth century, and, confining himself almost entirely to 
premises that Mandeville had accepted, he argued that modern hierarchical societies, 
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whether Mandeville’s or Montesquieu’s, must all rest on the violence of the rich against the 
poor .6 
If the Second Discourse sought to delegitimize existing inegalitarian social and 
political forms, the Social Contract provided the body of political theory that showed what a 
legitimate regime must look like, and in the light of which so much of Montesquieu’s 
presentation became untenable. The subtitle Rousseau eventually settled on for the Social 
Contract, was the ‘principles of political right’, or the ‘principes du droit politique’, exactly 
what he said in Emile that Montesquieu himself had failed to provide, and the moment 
when he made his objection to Montesquieu explicit came in a remark near the end of the 
discussion of democracy as a form of government. He outlined the ‘many things difficult to 
combine’ that a democracy would require, and then observed: 
That is why a famous Author attributed virtue to Republics as their principle; for all 
these conditions could not subsist without virtue: but for want of drawing the 
necessary distinctions, this noble genius often lacked in precision, sometimes in 
clarity, and he failed to see that since Sovereign authority is everywhere the same, 
the same principle must obtain in every well-constituted State, more or less, it is 
true, according to the form of the Government. (1997b, 91-2.) 
Monarchies might require less virtue, and democracies more, but virtue, understood in 
terms of a commitment to egalitarian citizenship and love of the patrie, was, for Rousseau, 
the principle of all legitimate political regimes. 
                                                 
6 On reading Rousseau’s Second Discourse as a Mandevillean reply to Mandeville, see 
Smith, “A Letter to the Authors of the Edinburgh Review” in Smith 1980, esp. pp. 250-51; 
Force 2003, 18-22 and 34-42; and Robertson 2005, 392-6. 
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By going back to the principes du droit politique, specifically in the form of a social 
contract argument, we might think that Rousseau was restating a version of Hobbes’s 
theory, or those of the modern natural lawyers, such as Pufendorf. But he firmly resisted 
the modern natural law school,7 having contempt for those he called the ‘jurisconsults’, 
who provided justifications for the rule of the oligarchs in his native Geneva or for the wars 
that the sovereigns of Europe were ceaselessly waging (Rousseau 1997b, 162; also 
Rosenblatt 1997). Indeed, his unpublished essay on ‘The State of War’, Rousseau presented 
his own version of the argument that Hobbesian political thought failed in its own terms, 
for whether or not a state were victorious in modern warfare, modern warfare was itself 
made possible by the Leviathan state, and was so bloody and destructive that it was crazy 
to think that such a Leviathan state could be the answer to the far more mild security 
dilemma of any plausible state of nature (Rousseau 1997b, 162-76; see also Tuck 1999, 
202-7). And with reference to the passage from Pufendorf on esteem and price, and against 
universal equality, reproduced earlier, Richard Tuck has remarked (in his unpublished 
2000 Robert P. Benedict Lectures at Boston University) that it ‘captures with remarkable 
clarity the twin objects of Rousseau’s scorn in the 1750s, commercial society in which 
commodities are exchanged on the basis of their price, and the society of social inequality 
in which discriminations are made on the basis of honour.’ Rousseau had more respect for 
Hobbes. Despite what he said about him in Emile, for example, he wrote elsewhere that 
Hobbes had been ‘one of the finest geniuses that ever lived’ (Rousseau 1997b, 164). But he 
also considered Hobbes to be an apologist for despotism owing to the chief theoretical gulf 
                                                 
7 Robert Derathé (1950) suggested that Rousseau was basically a member of the modern 
natural law school, but his position was refuted in Wokler (1994). But cf. Douglass 2011. 
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that separated their two political theories (42-4); for Hobbes sovereignty was necessarily 
representative in nature, and could be alienated or transferred, whereas for Rousseau the 
idea of representing sovereignty at all was absurd (113-16). The only legitimate sovereign 
body was the people itself, meeting face to face from time to time in order to ratify 
legislation—and insisting on this allowed Rousseau to deny the inequality that structured 
even more egalitarian interpretations of Hobbes’s political thought, that between the 
subjects and the sovereign. 
Rousseau’s distinctive contribution to this history of Non-Intrinsic Egalitarianism, 
then, is not that he was the first to articulate a Non-Intrinsic Egalitarian point of view. 
Montesquieu had done that with his depiction of democratic republicanism, as had other 
writers in the Utopian tradition before both of them, for whom the overcoming of pride 
was also often considered crucial to the possibility of happy social living together, as in 
More’s Utopia itself (Parrish 2007, 149-53). Rather, Rousseau was the first to tie the 
question of Non-Intrinsic Egalitarianism as it had come up within the modern tradition 
firmly to the question of legitimate politics itself, or the principes du droit politique, to 
argue that the only legitimate regime was a Non-Intrinsically Egalitarian polity—a move 
which Hobbes and Montesquieu, in their different ways, had each declined to make. O’Neill 
is right to say that the concerns of Non-Intrinsic Egalitarians have been ‘dominant themes 
in the history of egalitarian thought, at least since Rousseau’, but insofar as modern 
democratic theory is a series of footnotes to Rousseau’s Social Contract—a view I shall 
assert here but not defend (but see Gaus 1997)—Non-Intrinsic Egalitarianism is intimately 






 Many people who find themselves attracted to egalitarian politics find that they are 
also attracted to cosmopolitanism in ethics, and often enough to more rather than less 
robust accounts of the natural sociability of humankind. (Think of those on the political 
Left, for example, in ordinary life, who dislike those on the right for attributing too much to 
natural selfishness, and discounting the possibilities of altruism.) It’s a very striking feature 
of the period I’ve been discussing in this paper, however, that egalitarianism and 
cosmopolitanism and the thicker accounts of natural sociability never really line up in this 
neat way. The three conspicuously egalitarian views I’ve considered in this paper, whether 
Hobbes on the Unorthodox view, Montesquieu’s presentation of the democratic republic, or 
Rousseau’s political theory, all rest on the denial or the radical attenuation of natural 
sociability, and all reject cosmopolitan ethics at a fairly deep level. Indeed, both 
Montesquieu and Rousseau can plausibly be read as arguing that egalitarian social 
relations are possible only to the extent that the community thinks itself different from and 
superior to its neighbors: amour-propre, after all, must find an outlet somewhere. By 
contrast, those who taught a thicker account of natural sociability, whether Grotius, 
Pufendorf, Barbeyrac or Burlamaqui, were influential apologists for inequality (Rosenblatt 
1997, 90-101); and the most obvious cosmopolitans in the tradition are the Augustinians, 
especially Fénelon.  
The reason for this is that the thinkers I’ve been discussing were extremely nervous 
about how deep the various human practices of comparing ourselves to one another go, 
and how fundamentally the subjective judgments of superiority and inferiority that we so 
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frequently make shape our lives and those of the others around us. What Rousseau and 
Hobbes (on the Unorthodox view at least) both suggest is that if you’re serious about doing 
away with the pride and jealousies and vainglory and stigmatizing inequalities that 
disfigure our social existence, then a very radical and distinctively illiberal political solution 
is required. And if, with Montesquieu and Rousseau, the point of such an egalitarian 
community is that it exercises self-rule, ruling out the option of a monarchical Hobbesian 
sovereign, then the population needs to organize itself in the ways they recommend, 
mutual surveillance, moral censorship, gender segregation and all. Contrary to what so 
many contemporary egalitarians have said so often about their own commitments, in fact, 
for these thinkers equality really does mean a kind of sameness. 
One of the attractions of Non-Intrinsic Egalitarianism is that it is not just an abstract 
ethical theory. Non-Intrinsic Egalitarians need to pay close attention to the social 
institutions and the psychological mechanisms that generate stigma or that undermine self-
respect. And it may be that those who want to place Non-Intrinsic Egalitarianism at the 
heart of their political thinking today might usefully be thinking in a much more 
sociological vein that they have been doing hitherto. What in the contemporary world 
sustains and what undermines a politics of Non-Intrinsic Egalitarianism? The best example 
of a recent society that comes fairly close to the kind of democratic republics Montesquieu 
and Rousseau were thinking of seems to me to be something like Israel in the 1950s and 
1960s, and I think they would both agree on something that seems to me to be 
sociologically plausible, that the egalitarianism and the nationalism and the militarism and 
the antagonism towards her neighbors that characterized Israeli political development in 
this period were all deeply interwoven with and provided mutual support for one another. 
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If that isn’t the kind of society Non-Intrinsic Egalitarians today want to work towards, then 
what kinds of institutions might provide adequate functional substitutes for the various 
practices of nationalism, militarism and xenophobia? Or we might think of European social 
democracy in its classic phase, 1945-73, in which a far more moderately egalitarian 
society—and in many ways not egalitarian at all—was shaped and sustained by factors as 
important and diverse as the Cold War, a remarkable capitalist boom (in French, les trente 
glorieuses), and the strikingly contingent way in which the Second World War helped to 
bring about a far-reaching transformation of the right-hand side of the ideological 
spectrum. Again, if Non-Intrinsic Egalitarianism is to present itself as more than wishful 
thinking for a bygone and deeply imperfect era, it has a lot of thinking to do, but most of it 
on the terrain of political sociology rather than high-level normative theory. 
Rousseau was quite right to criticize Montesquieu for his neglect of the principles of 
political right, but we might conclude that our problem is the opposite of that. Rousseauism 
in its contemporary incarnation as Rawlsian political thought is ubiquitous in many parts of 
the academy, and it pays the closest attention imaginable to the principes du droit 
politique. (For a similar complaint, see Hurley 2006, 152.) What our age needs, by contrast, 
is a revival of the tradition of political thinking associated above all, ironically enough, with 
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Response to the Editor 
 
I have revised the article, and am resubmitting it now, in a slightly shorter, tighter version. 
 
The three major changes are as follows: 
 
 The passage on Mandeville has been cut. 
 
 The discussion of O’Neill has been extended, both at the beginning (to explain more 
clearly why I am focusing on this article) and at the end (with a new sentence 
addressing a key point that a number of readers have raised, about just how ‘non-
intrinsic egalitarianism’ positions itself between ‘instrumental’ and ‘intrinsic’ 
accounts of the same value). (I have however kept the short discussion of Parfit: the 
significance of O’Neill’s argument is that it constitutes the most theoretically cogent 
individual response to Parfit, who in turn made the single most important contribution 
to the post-Dworkin debate, so he warrants mention; and I refer to Parfit explicitly 
later on in the piece, in order to elucidate why it is reasonable to view Montesquieu’s 
depiction of the democratic republic as an instantion of non-intrinsic egalitarianism.) 
 
 The earlier version was justly criticised for the use of the language of ‘Strong’ and 
‘Weak’ to describe different interpretations of Hobbes, which overlapped with 
O’Neill’s different distinction between Strong and Weak egalitarianism: I have 
replaced this with a distinction between Orthodox and Unorthodox interpretations of 
Hobbes. 
 
In addition to these changes, some irrelevant historical detail has been cut, some further 
‘apparatus’ has been added (e.g. new items in the bibliography include De Dijn 2013, 
Douglass 2011, Gaus 1997), the reliance on Hont has been de-emphasised somewhat, and 
various minor changes have been made throughout. 
 
Response to Reviewer #1 
 
It was gratifying to read that Reviewer #1 considered this to be a ‘stunningly good piece’.  
 
I have added, as requested, a ‘little bit more explaining Martin O’Neill’s categories’ and a 
mention (via Jubb 2015—a piece from the Journal of Politics) of how his piece has proved 
fruitful for recent political theory. 
 
Response to Reviewer #2 
 
Despite Reviewer #2’s recommendation against publication, I was glad to read that s/he 
‘deeply approve[d] of both the methods of the manuscript and its important conclusion’.  
 
I agree that the article ranges sufficiently widely that it cannot fully ‘demonstrate this thesis 
in the space available’. As Reviewer #2 suggests, that would require a monograph in its own 
right. But the point of the article was not so much to do that, but to provide a more schematic 
treatment, on the one hand to show contemporary political philosophers how their most 
significant recent arguments speak to a central theme of modern political thought in ways that 
they may not perhaps fully recognise, and to show historians of political thought how the 
richest contemporary political philosophy has still not fully moved beyond the confines of the 
Revision Memo
debates with which they are most concerned. This is above all why I hope to publish in a 
general political science journal, such as the Journal of Politics, rather than in either a 
specialist political philosophy journal (which would find the article too historical) or a 
specialist history journal (which would find the engagement with contemporary theory 
eccentric). It is true that work of this kind can never really be the final word on the questions 
it considers, or the arguments it proposes, for some of the reasons Reviewer #2 indicates. But 
I strongly believe that there is a place for work of this kind in the literature, and hope that the 
revisions will have made it acceptable for publication. 
 
In response to criticism, I have shortened some of the ‘extended quotations’ (such as in the 
section on Pufendorf), trimmed back some of the ‘basic facts about historical context’ 
(though kept some others, bearing in mind that this is an article for a general political science 
readership, who cannot be expected to know much about, e.g. Nicole or Fénelon), and 
excised altogether the section on Mandeville, which helps to streamline the presentation (not 
least since instead of bouncing back and forth across the English Channel, the Nicole-
Fénelon-Mandeville-Rousseau sequence keeps things focused on the French argument). 
 
If there are ‘no real advances in the considerable existing literatures on each’ of the writers I 
examine, again, that’s not quite the point. This article doesn’t aim to change anyone’s mind 
about Pufendorf or Montesquieu, so much as to show how if you fit these writers’ arguments 
together in a certain configuration, one can see more clearly than hitherto how they speak to 
some large-scale questions in the analysis of politics, both historical and contemporary.  
 
I have come to agree that the language of ‘Strong’ and ‘Weak’ interpretations of Hobbes was 
causing confusion, so that has been jettisoned. If the earlier version was ‘indecisive’ on the 
question of Montesquieu’s verdict on classical republicanism, I have removed that indecision 
(he is against), with a reference to De Dijn, who has offered one of the best recent 
presentations of that case (though there are also passages by Sonenscher or Douglass that 
would have done just as well). 
 
I close by saying that I do appreciate it that Reviewer #2 would like to read an imagined 
book, with six or seven chapters covering the ground of this article. It is true that I do have a 
book project which moves back and forth between what we might call contemporary (since 
1971?) and modern (since 1651?) political philosophy—but the book in progress is not 
straightforwardly an expanded version of this article (it has more to say about justice and 
Rawls, than about equality on Dworkin/Parfit/O’Neill), which was always envisaged as a 
free-standing piece. 
 
Response to Reviewer #3 
 
I thank Reviewer #3 for detailed comments that have helped me make this a stronger piece. 
 
Reviewer #3 rightly remarks that ‘The most serious weakness of this paper, from which the 
others derive, is that there is too much going on’. As noted above, there is now somewhat less 
going on, with the excision of Mandeville, the retreat from the doubling-up of the language of 
‘Weak’ and ‘Strong’, and the trimming back of some historical detail. It is a more 
streamlined paper than it was before, which ought to help make the central argumentative line 
a bit clearer. 
 
Reviewer #3 asks for ‘some justification for the choices…made’. I have said a bit more in the 
revised piece with this concern in mind. I say that O’Neill has been selected as the most 
substantial political-philosophical response to Parfit, who himself has offered the most 
influential post-Dworkin intervention in the analytical philosophical conversation. This kind 
of liberal political philosophy, in my view, needs to move beyond Parfit (and further beyond 
Dworkin), and O’Neill helps it to do that; and from my point of view has the further benefit 
of facilitating the reintegration of the debate about equality with pre-Dworkinian debate—
which is why I start where I do. It is probably the case that Scanlon could have served as an 
alternative to O’Neill (indeed, not coincidentally, Scanlon was O’Neill’s doctoral supervisor 
once upon a time). But O’Neill’s argument does I think have a crisp analytical architecture 
that makes it more suitable for my purposes than anything to be found in Scanlon’s 
equivalent writings. 
 
In terms of the historical ‘choices…made’, I hope things are a little clearer in the current 
version. When introducing Pufendorf, I now make the link to the syllabi of the modern 
universities, with reference to Jon Parkin’s theme of ‘taming the Leviathan’: Pufendorf’s 
significance is as someone who helps to domesticate Hobbesian argument for elite 
sensibilities (which in turn feeds through to Rousseau’s fierce rejection of the natural law 
paradigm, as one who saw exactly what was going on). And carving Mandeville out of the 
picture means that there is now a cleaner argumentative sequence going through the various 
French authors: Fénelon is juxtaposed against Nicole; Montesquieu is read as offering an 
alternative argument to Fénelon; and Rousseau is presented as a critic of Montesquieu. 
   
The revised presentation of Pufendorf should also, I hope, address another of Reviewer #3’s 
concerns, about the rival interpretation of Hobbes. The point is that Hobbes can plausibly be 
interpreted in different ways (and we should be no more surprised by the existence of Left 
Hobbesianism and Right Hobbesianism than by Left Hegelianism and Right Hegelianism, or, 
more recently, of Left Rawlsianism and if not Right then at least not-so-Left Rawlsianism), 
and Pufendorf is now introduced as someone who is working to spin the Hobbesian argument 
in the least egalitarian direction that he can. 
 
I am going to push back against the criticism that was offered of the Abstract. I am advised 
not to ‘lead’ with the distinction between telic and deontic egalitarianism, since this is ‘not 
really the topic of the paper’. But what I lead with is not the distinction but ‘the critique of 
the influential distinction’, and that’s right: the focused discussion gets going with O’Neill’s 
paper, which has been selected precisely because of the productive critique of Parfit’s 
distinction that it presents. If this is thought to continue to be problematic, I can recast the 
Abstract, but I am keeping as it is for now.  
 
‘Non-intrinsic egalitarianism must be clarified’. I have added about a hundred words to the 
discussion of O’Neill, both to explain why I am focusing on this contribution, and to 
elucidate the particular point Reviewer #3 makes about how the values NIE serves ‘aren't 
fully separable from an appreciation of the value of equality itself’. 
 
I have cut the language of ‘Strong’ and ‘Weak’ from the discussion of Hobbes. 
 
In terms of how ‘some of the interpretations offered are quite controversial’, I hope that the 
more streamlined presentation of the argument will make things a little clearer as to why I am 
discussing the various authors in the way that I do.  
 
With regard to the particular examples offered: concerning Hobbes I accept the critical point 
that is being made, and no longer seek to pass off Tuck’s interpretation of Hobbes as an 
instantiation of NIE for the reason given (that it’s ultimately about not killing one another). 
Concerning Hobbes and Fénelon, I agree that there are important differences of both theory 
and substance. The point is to draw attention to some similarities, or affinities, not to say that 
these are two versions of the same argument. I hope this is a bit clearer now. 
 
Reviewer #3 also makes the point that ‘more work is needed to clarify which propositions the 
author wishes to defend’, and that ‘This could be accomplished by whittling down the 
material or by linking all the pieces in a clear unified scheme’. I hope that the excision of 
Mandeville, which allows for a cleaner exposition of the French end of the argument does 
contribute to both a ‘whittling down’ and towards the desired ‘clear unified scheme’. On the 
earlier point, though, I want to push back a little again. On my understanding of what I have 
written, the aim is not to ‘defend’ a particular set of ‘propositions’ that can straightforwardly 
be itemised. It is a more discursive piece than that, and that is partly because (as indicated 
above) it seeks to engage readers in contemporary political philosophy, the history of 
political thought, and political science more generally. As I read (and wrote!) this paper, the 
way it ranges widely is a feature, not a bug. I worry that a more tightly focused paper would 
also be a less interesting, perhaps stimulating one, and that is why I have not moved 
decisively in this direction. 
 
I thank Reviewer #3 for the recommendation of Lovejoy’s book. I suspect I agree with 
Reviewer #3 when I say that Lovejoy’s work is often unfairly criticised on methodological 
grounds. I’ve certainly got something useful in the past out of his work on primitivism. But 
having said that, this is—as Reviewer #3 is the first to notice!—a paper in which there is a lot 
already going on, and so I have declined the temptation to chase down yet another line of 











The recent, crisp articulation of ‘Non-Intrinsic Egalitarianism’ emerged out of the critique 
of the influential distinction between ‘Telic’ and ‘Deontic’ egalitarianisms. Part of the 
promise of this approach is that it can be deployed in order to reintegrate these recent 
philosophical debates about equality with much older currents in the history of political 
thought. The paper explains how the century of argument in England and France after 1650 
created the intellectual space for the kind of presentation of Non-Intrinsic Egalitarian ideas 
such as we find in Rousseau’s major political writings from the 1750s and afterwards. In so 
doing, the paper illustrates the striking extent to which fundamental political-theoretical 
disagreements are often driven not so much by competing normative commitments as by 
divergent understandings of how those commitments ramify through the sociological and 
institutional possibilities that disputants imagine are plausibly open to them.





The debates about equality that have loomed so large in recent academic liberal 
political theory, at least since the publication of Ronald Dworkin’s pair of articles on ‘What 
is Equality’ (Dworkin 1981a, 1981b) have been remarkable for their degree of analytical 
and philosophical sophistication on the one hand, and for their relative lack of reference to 
the history of political thought on the other. One reason for this lack of attention to 
previous reflection on the subject is methodological. Those who participate in these 
debates like to test philosophical principles against what they call their ‘intuitions’, often 
through the construction of elaborate thought experiments, with the goal (as it is 
sometimes described) of reaching ‘reflective equilibrium’, or a state in which intuitions and 
principles harmonize and provide mutual support for each other.1 This is a method that can 
be learned and practiced by those who are largely ignorant of the history of reflection on 
whatever the particular topic to hand happens to be; and, indeed, this is one reason why 
this style of philosophy lends itself well to undergraduate teaching, since students can jump 
straight into a trolley problem, or a description of some kind of ‘original position’, or an 
auction involving clamshells, without having to absorb much political philosophy before 
they can start to make sense—or start to think that they can make sense, at any rate—of 
                                                 
1 John Rawls coined the term ‘reflective equilibrium’, although he is careful to talk about 
what he calls ‘considered judgments’ and ‘considered judgments duly pruned’, in place of 
the language of ‘intuitions’. See Rawls 1972, 20. 
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what’s going on.2 
There may, however, be a more interesting reason as to why reference to historical 
arguments have played such a slight role in the recent debates about equality. Jeremy 
Waldron once observed that ‘Dworkin’s distinctive contribution has been to insist that it is 
not enough for the egalitarian to “come up with” an answer. It has to be a defensible 
answer; indeed, it has to be an answer that can be defended on egalitarian grounds’ 
(Waldron 2001, reviewing Dworkin 2000). Central to the recent debate, then, has been a 
concern to treat equality as a distinctive moral value, rather than as any kind of 
instrumental value pressed into the service of more fundamental values, such as liberty or 
the maximization of utility. Those contemporary egalitarians who want to insist on the 
non-derivative character of their commitment to equality, then, may very well find that the 
resources of the tradition of Western political philosophy are not especially helpful, and so 
they are frequently ignored. For if we are convinced that equality is to be valued primarily 
for non-instrumental purposes, then the history of political thought can be confusing 
terrain, very crudely because those discourses that have been organized around some kind 
of claim about the fundamental value of equality have tended in practice to endorse, or at 
least not decisively to oppose, what appear to us to be highly inegalitarian politics. By 
contrast, the richest accounts of the goodness of equality and, in particular, of the badness 
of inequality that we possess in the tradition have tended not to insist on the fundamental, 
non-derivative, or non-instrumental character of that equality.  
So: those historic discourses that have been organized around a claim about the 
                                                 
2 For critical discussion of such methods in ethics, together with a dose of skepticism that 
these ‘neo-Kantian’ methods have much to do with Kant, see Wood 2008, 43-54. 
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equality of human beings—whether Christian religion, Stoic philosophy, Roman law, and, 
more recently, modern natural rights theory—have all been highly ambivalent in practice 
about slavery, with all four presenting claims either about why slavery doesn’t really 
matter, or about how certain kinds of slavery might in practice be compatible with a 
teaching of formal human equality. Examples of the former would include those claims 
about how in Christ there is no slave and free (Galatians 3:28, 1 Corinthians 12:13, 
Colossians 3:11; cf. Philemon 1:12, Ephesians 6:5, 1 Timothy 6:1-3) or the Stoics’ insistence 
that what matters in life is the freedom of the mind rather than the body, as the mind is 
something that is always in our own power, in a way that the external world, which 
includes the physical movements of our own limbs, is not (e.g., Manual 1—and cf. 14—in 
Epictetus 1989). Examples of the latter might be the large body of Roman law dealing with 
slavery (Institutes, 1.3.2 in Birks, McLeod, and Krueger 1987; and Digest, 1.5.4.1 and 
12.6.64 in Mommsen, Krueger, and Watson 1985), or the way in which the modern natural 
rights theory—arguably the forerunner of our current doctrine of human rights—was 
invented in the seventeenth century in part in order to provide new justifications of slavery 
to replace the older Aristotelian arguments which no longer seemed so convincing in the 
face of the kinds of skepticism articulated by Montaigne (and others) and of what we used 
to call the scientific revolution. John Locke’s arguments about slavery in the Second 
Treatise of Civil Government are probably the best-known examples of these, but generally 
analogous passages can be dug out of Grotius, Hobbes, Pufendorf, and the rest (Locke 1988, 
283-5; Grotius 2005, 1360-73; Hobbes 1994, 126-9; 1998, ch. 8, 102-6; 1991, 141-2; 
Pufendorf 1991, 129-31; see also Pateman 1988, 39-76). 
On the other hand, when writers in the tradition do write about the goodness of 
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equality or the badness of inequality, as I have indicated, it is often unclear that equality is 
playing any kind of fundamental or non-instrumental role. Take just the two names 
mentioned in the title of this paper, for example. Thomas Hobbes argued that the natural 
law teaches that each must acknowledge each other as an equal, but the natural law is a set 
of precepts organized around delivering the goal of civil peace, and all the values it 
espouses are strictly instrumental to that end. Jean-Jacques Rousseau is probably the most 
important political philosopher of equality of them all, his Discourse on the Origin of 
Inequality, still the key text addressing the topic in typical university courses on the history 
of modern political thought, but even Rousseau is explicit in his Social Contract that the 
varieties of political, social, and economic equality he prescribes are so prescribed in virtue 
of the fact that they are, on his view, necessary conditions for being able to live in security 
and freedom, rather than because they are somehow independently valuable in their own 
right (Rousseau 1997, 78). 
I turn now to ‘What Should Egalitarians Believe?’, an article by Martin O’Neill from 
the 2008 volume of Philosophy & Public Affairs. O’Neill offers, to my mind, to most 
significant political-philosophical response to what has been the most significant individual 
contribution to the debate on equality since Dworkin. That is to say, he has taken aim at a 
central distinction that has structured so many of the treatments of equality over the last 
quarter century or so, which is that between ‘telic’ and ‘deontic’ egalitarianism, as 
presented by Derek Parfit in his well-known 1991 Lindley Lecture at the University of 
Kansas, ‘Equality or Priority’ (O’Neill 2008, Parfit 1995, 1997). Teleological, or ‘telic’, 
egalitarians accept what he calls ‘the principle of equality’ and believe that ‘it is in itself bad 
if some people are worse off than others’ (Parfit 1997, 204). These are to be distinguished 
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from those he calls ‘deontic’ egalitarians, who believe that although ‘we should sometimes 
aim for equality, that is not because we would thereby make the outcome better’ (207). For 
deontic egalitarians, inequality is not bad, but it is unjust. 
According to O’Neill, however, we’re not in Kansas anymore. ‘In its most attractive 
versions’, he maintains, ‘egalitarianism is neither Telic nor Deontic’, but some variety of 
what he calls ‘Non-Intrinsic Egalitarianism’ (O’Neill 2008. 121). Non-Intrinsic Egalitarians 
object to distributive inequalities insofar as they create stigmatizing differences in status; 
lead to the domination of one part of society by the rest; weaken self-respect, especially 
that of the worst-off; create servility and deferential behavior; and undermine healthy 
fraternal social relations and attitudes (121-3). From the standpoint of Non-Intrinsic 
Egalitarianism, Telic egalitarianism appears ‘extravagant and undermotivated’ (123), 
insofar as it fails to illuminate why it is in itself bad for inequality to exist or to persist in 
society; while Deontic egalitarianism can also be rejected, insofar as Deontic egalitarians 
invoke ‘some other moral reason’ (124), such as justice, to explain why inequalities should 
be reduced or eliminated. For Non-Intrinsic Egalitarians, by contrast, the inequalities we 
seek to reduce or eliminate are picked out not because it is intrinsically bad that they exist, 
but rather because of the pernicious consequences of letting them persist in terms of 
stigma, domination, or servility. But this isn’t a simple instrumentalist story, in which we 
promote various equalisation measures in pursuit of some other, deeper moral or political 
value. Rather, the moral reasons we invoke in defense of a project of inequality-reduction 
aren’t fully separable from an appreciation of the value of equality itself, involving 
reference to what O’Neill calls a ‘complex background picture of how people should live 
together as equals’ (125). In particular, the harms that Non-Intrinsic Egalitarianism seeks 
 6 
 
to obviate relate in one way to another to an idea of self-respect which is ‘itself a 
distinctively egalitarian idea: it is the idea of one’s self-conception as an efficacious and 
undominated agent…enjoying an equality of standing with others’ (128). That O’Neill’s 
intervention has been a generative one can be seen in terms of its reception. Jubb, for 
example, has shown in this journal (2015) how O’Neill’s perspective can fruitfully 
contribute to the ‘realist’ agenda in contemporary political theory. 
I find the ways in which O’Neill articulates Non-Intrinsic Egalitarianism to be 
politically attractive and intellectually persuasive. But his essay is also notable insofar as it 
holds out a promise that we might be able to reintegrate to some extent the contemporary 
debates about equality among political philosophers with the history of pre-1981 political 
thought. O’Neill himself is alert to this. He notes that the concerns of Non-Intrinsic 
Egalitarians are the ‘dominant themes in the history of egalitarian thought, at least since 
Rousseau’ (129), and he identifies Non-Intrinsic Egalitarianism as ‘itself a Rousseauvian 
position’ (129, n. 28). What I seek to do in the rest of this paper, then, is to try to explain 
why Non-Intrinsic Egalitarianism came to be such a central element of Rousseau’s political 
theory; or, perhaps better, how the previous century of argument on related themes in 
England and France created the intellectual space by the middle of the eighteenth century 
for the kind of presentation of Non-Intrinsic Egalitarian ideas such as we find in Rousseau’s 






Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) has appeared to many readers to be some kind of 
egalitarian, but we need to acknowledge from the outset that his thinking about equality is 
complex (Hoekstra 2012). The ninth law of nature might teach each man to acknowledge 
every other as his equal (Hobbes 1991, 107), but this is not because equality is 
unambiguously a good thing. Indeed, the state of nature is a state of war in large part 
because of some of the equalities that obtain there. The famous chapter in Leviathan on the 
state of nature announces the theme immediately, beginning with the words, ‘Nature hath 
made men so equall…’ (86), with Hobbes going on to single out as particularly important 
the way in which from an ‘equality of ability, ariseth equality of hope in the attaining of our 
Ends’ (87). While in the civil condition the citizens may stand in a certain kind of 
relationship of equality vis-à-vis one another, that civil society itself is constructed around, 
even constituted by, an awesome inequality between the subjects and the sovereign. The 
theoretical heart of Hobbes’s concern with equality, however, is clear enough. Since it is 
men’s pride together with their propensity to make really bad judgments that makes 
peaceable living impossible in the state of nature, the task of political philosophy is to find a 
way of defusing this explosive combination. Much of Hobbes’s political theory involves 
secularizing religious claims, and this part of it is no exception. In place of the traditional 
Augustinian condemnation of pride as an offense against God (Augustine 1998, 608), 
Hobbes transforms pride into an offense against human equality, and close to the core of 
his argument is a claim that we must acknowledge one another as equals, in order to make 
possible the kind of political institutions and practices that will bring an end to the violence 
of the proud. Indeed, Hobbes insists that we must make this acknowledgment of equality 
even if we are not in fact equal to each other, in whatever sense we might happen to think 
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relevant (Hobbes 1991, 107; Hoekstra 2012, esp. 104-5). The centrality of pride in 
Hobbes’s argument is even indicated in his book’s title, for Leviathan is described in the 
book of Job in these terms: ‘Upon earth there is not his like, who is made without fear. He 
beholdeth all high things: he is a king over all the children of pride’ (Job 41:33-4). When 
Hobbes turns to explain his choice of title at the end of chapter 28, furthermore, he flags the 
theme explicitly again just before he introduces his Biblical sea-monster with a remark 
about how it is man’s ‘Pride and other Passions’ that ‘have compelled him to submit himself 
to Government’ (Hobbes 1991, 220-21). 
So far, so straightforward. But what might Hobbesian civil society be like in 
practice? On the most usual view of the matter—which I shall call the Orthodox view—our 
passions remain the same as they were in the state of nature, but the new artificial 
institutions that structure our lives ensure that the passions that helped to generate 
violence in the state of nature no longer issue in behavior destructive either to ourselves or 
to others. First and foremost, the state provides the kind of effective law enforcement that 
creates overwhelming incentives for us not to assault our fellow citizens. But also, and 
more interestingly, perhaps, our passions to dominate or to glory over others find an outlet 
in everyday activities that don’t tend to threaten the fabric of society. Some of us enter 
reality TV shows or take part in competitive sports and games. Others try to write the Great 
American Novel, or submit their scholarly articles for publication in Philosophy & Public 
Affairs and other leading journals of egalitarian political philosophy. And it may be that 
economic activity is like this, too. One of the problems of the state of nature is that we can’t 
there enjoy what Hobbes calls ‘commodious living’ (Hobbes 1991, 90). But in civil society, 
instead of violently subjugating one another, we can work to accumulate wealth in order to 
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have a bigger house, or a faster car, or a snappier wardrobe than those of our fellow 
citizens, and we take a certain pleasure in the relative superiority that we enjoy in these 
regards. 
This is not obviously an egalitarian vision of society. If we recall O’Neill’s Weak 
Egalitarianism, which was when we are concerned to reduce distributive inequalities, but 
not chiefly for any kind of distinctively egalitarian reason—we might note that it does not 
even meet that threshold, for as I have described things there is no particular concern to 
reduce the distributive inequalities that are generated through the various practices and 
institutions of the civil society, so long as that society is able to regulate its affairs without 
violence. Indeed, the point of permitting or even encouraging social and economic 
inequality on this view might be precisely to avoid such violence; the inequalities may be 
functional for the preservation of peace by satiating the yearnings of the proud.  
 There is more to be said on this subject, however, than simply stating what I’ve 
called the Orthodox view. Just as Hegel’s philosophy naturally lent itself to ‘Left’ and ‘Right’ 
variations, so too we should not be surprised to find something analogous going on in the 
case of Hobbes.  István Hont, for example, has argued for a contrast between the Hobbes of 
De Cive, who was ‘relatively relaxed about economic activity’, with taxation to cover 
military defense, but for whom ‘most private trading activity fell under the rubric of 
innocent liberty’, and the Hobbes of Leviathan for whom ‘the regulatory regime was much 
more detailed and rigid’ (Hont 2005, 45), with sumptuary laws, the regulation of trade, 
suspicion of the activities of the very wealthy, state provision for those unable to provide 
for themselves, and so on, in short, some of the pillars of what we might today call a 
broadly egalitarian social democratic welfare state. If such measures systematically worked 
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to reduce economic inequality, we would then have an instantiation of O’Neill’s Weak 
Egalitarianism. 
There is, furthermore, one interpretation of Hobbes in the current literature—let’s 
call it the Unorthodox view—which makes him into an even more substantively egalitarian, 
and perhaps even utopian theorist. On this view, which has been pressed by Richard Tuck, 
Hobbesian civil society doesn’t involve a redirection of our potentially destructive passions 
so much as a transformation of them. This view draws attention to the way that on 
Hobbes’s distinctive account of the passions, set out in each of the three main presentations 
of his political ideas, the emotions we experience are centrally bound up with the 
competitive struggle for survival in the state of nature, and they are all concerned with 
judgments of superiority and inferiority. As Tuck puts it, ‘Our entire emotional life, 
according to Hobbes, extraordinary as this might seem, is in fact a complicated set of beliefs 
about the best way of securing ourselves against our fellow men, with all the familiar 
complexities of love, pride, and laughter in the end reducible simply to a set of ideas about 
our own relative safety from other people’s power’ (2004, 132). In the well-founded 
commonwealth, then, on the one hand, the daily struggle for existence is no longer a 
pressing concern; and, on the other hand, the institution of the sovereign settles once and 
for all the question of who is to enjoy precedency over the rest. The result of these two 
developments is a transformation of our emotional lives, with the prideful passions of 
glorying and vainglorying fading away, to be replaced by—well, maybe by not very much at 
all. In the civil state we are finally able to live according to the laws of nature, 
acknowledging equality, behaving charitably, showing gratitude, and avoiding the 
expression of insult and contempt towards our fellow citizens. But note that even this 
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interpretation of Hobbes does not transform him into a Strong or Non-Intrinsic Egalitarian 
in O’Neill’s terms, and that however much this utopian view of Leviathan might concern 
itself with the avoidance of stigmatizing differences in status, of unequal power 
relationships, or of expressions of contempt that injure the self-respect of weaker members 
of society, it remains a kind of Weak Egalitarianism, insofar as the equalities that obtain are 
still straightforwardly the consequence of a politics of preventing violence, or of the 




Although Hobbes’s claims about equality were attacked by his conservative, 
patriarchalist critics (e.g., Clarendon 1676, 32-3, or Coke 1660, 26, quoted in Parkin 2007, 
230), other writers in the modern natural law tradition retained some kind of claim about 
equality at the heart of their theories, too. I’m not going to address any of John Locke’s 
arguments here. His egalitarianism is complicated, but seems to me to lean more towards 
what we might call Intrinsic Egalitarianism, rather than being any kind of Non-Intrinsic 
Egalitarianism, Strong or Weak. (For relevant discussion of Locke see especially Waldron 
2002.) I do, however, want to say something about Samuel Pufendorf (1632-1694), who 
was far more influential in his own day than he is in ours—whereas in the case of Locke, it 
is other way around, more or less, at least with regard to the kind of arguments I’m 
considering here. Pufendorf can be located as a component part of the process that Jon 
Parkin has called ‘taming the Leviathan’ (2007), through which the more radical, 
subversive, or disturbing aspects of Hobbes’s argument could be smoothed away as his 
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theory was revised and incorporated into an invented tradition of modern natural law that 
could be safely propounded in the universities. What’s striking about Pufendorf’s 
presentation for present purposes is the way in which he can repeat some of Hobbes’s 
foundational egalitarian moves that underpin something like what I’ve called the Orthodox 
view, but then works to spin out from them an even more overtly inegalitarian vision of 
modern society than anything we find in Hobbes. 
So: Pufendorf’s theory has a Hobbesian core. Men might be naturally unequal with 
respect to their various physical and mental attributes, and yet he demands (as the title of 
book 3, chapter 2 of The Law of Nature and Nations has it), ‘That all Men are to be 
accounted by Nature equal’ (cf. Viroli 1988, 66). Here are some of his words: ‘Since then 
human Nature agrees equally to all Persons, and since no one can live a sociable Life with 
another, who does not own and respect him as a Man; it follows as a Command of the Law 
of Nature, that every Man should esteem, and treat another as one who is naturally his 
Equal, or who is a Man as well as he’ (Pufendorf 1749, 224). But although this part of the 
natural law is framed in broadly egalitarian terms, Pufendorf strongly resisted any further 
moves in the direction of substantive social or economic equality. ‘[D]isparity of Riches 
does not of itself cause any Inequality3 amongst Fellow-Subjects’, he declared, and there is 
‘nothing in this Civil Inequality any ways repugnant to those Precepts, which we have 
before deduced from a natural Equality (1749, 232). And in his discussion of price and 
esteem, for example, he quoted, paraphrased and registered his disagreement with 
                                                 
3 The printed text here has ‘Equality’, but this must be a typographical error, and it is 
corrected in a centuries-old hand in the edition I consulted (the British Library copy 
available through ECCO).  
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Hobbes’s own discussion of what it is to honor someone (e.g. in ch. 10 of Hobbes 1991), 
and included this remark: 
And as the chief Reason why a Price was set upon Things, was, that when they were 
to be exchanged or removed from one Person to another, they might be the better 
compared with one another; so the End intended by Esteem, is, that we may be able 
to form a Comparison between Men, by setting, as it were, a Value upon them, and, 
in Consequence, establish a becoming Order and Distance between them, whenever 
they should happen to be united; it evidently appearing, that nothing was more 
absolutely inconsistent with the Convenience of Life, than an universal Equality 
(Pufendorf 1749, 800).4 
This last remark, in fact, points towards what is one of the most substantial 
theoretical disagreements between Hobbes and Pufendorf. For Hobbes, honor was mostly a 
troublesome business, driving men to seek precedence over one another and, above all, to 
avoid losing face. Hence ‘glory’, closely related to honor in Hobbes’s typology of the 
passions, was one of the causes of war in the state of nature. Honor and esteem were far 
less troubling for Pufendorf, however, as any tendency that practices of honoring and 
                                                 
4 The ensuing discussion of esteem is then structured around a distinction between ‘simple 
esteem’, which is what all citizens owe one another, as long as they do not violate basic 
norms of sociability or non-criminality, and ‘intensive esteem’, which is how they make the 
kind of discriminations described in this passage in the civil state. This passage is discussed 
by Viroli 1988, 81, though the interpretation of the relationships that hold between Hobbes 
and Pufendorf and between Pufendorf and Rousseau are different to the ones presented 
here, for which I am indebted to Richard Tuck. 
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esteeming others might have towards fomenting conflict in the state of nature was more 
than balanced by a second, utilitarian tendency, which fostered a certain kind of sociability 
among men even in the state of nature. Men might not have had a straightforwardly natural 
instinct or propensity to be sociable, on Pufendorf’s view, but in the state of nature they 
were weak and needy, and this aspect of their condition drove them to engage in exchange, 
commerce, trade with one another, all for the sake of utility. We might say, if we like this 
kind of language, that where the state of nature was more like a zero-sum game on 
Hobbes’s account, it was, with reciprocal exchange, a positive-sum game as far as Pufendorf 
was concerned. This ‘commercial sociability’, to use István Hont’s jargon (e.g. 2005, 40-41), 
was not the foundation of the state—as we might think that it was for Aristotle, for whom 
the polis originated in the bare needs of life, even if it continued in existence for the sake of 
a good life (1988, 1252b30)—but it was the foundation of a very influential account of non-
political society. Indeed, this distinctive theorization of sociability, or, in Latin, socialitas, 
led to Pufendorf’s followers being known as the ‘socialists’ or socialisti in seventeenth- and 
eighteenth-century Germany (on which see Hont 2005, 159-60 n. 1). 
 
The Augustinians: Pierre Nicole and François de Fénelon 
 
Just as the resources of the modern natural law tradition could be deployed in the 
service of a range of arguments, from what I’ve called the Unorthodox view of Hobbes 
through to the much more inegalitarian approach of Pufendorffian commercial sociability, 
seventeenth-century Augustinianism (here fairly broadly construed) was another 
discourse that could generate sharply-competing economic orientations. Pierre Nicole 
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(1625-1695), for example, who belonged to the group of dissident Catholic ultra-
Augustinians known as the Jansenists, developed an argument that could look strikingly 
like Pufendorf’s, even though it was built on very different theoretical foundations. A very 
different kind of Augustinian, François de Salignac de la Mothe-Fénelon (1651-1715), 
Archbishop of Cambrai and anti-Jansenist, provided an argument which has some affinities 
with a more egalitarian interpretation of Hobbes. 
Augustinians teach that after the Fall of Man, humans are doomed to sin in the 
absence of divine grace, i.e., to act on morally base motives. These were generally grouped 
together under the general heading of ‘concupiscence’, but concerning which Nicole came 
to deploy a slightly different vocabulary, that of ‘amour-propre’, or self-love (1696). 
Although it was sinful to act on the promptings of our self-love, Nicole argued that divine 
Providence ensured that, when we did so, society remained just as orderly and prosperous 
as it would have been had we acted in accordance with the morally preferable motives of 
charity, understood as the disinterested love of God and one’s neighbor (1696; Parrish 
2007, 188-203). This being the case, we could never reliably infer from the observable 
consequences of our actions whether we had acted virtuously or not, whether we had in 
fact been the recipients of the kind of divine grace that would enable us to act 
meritoriously; and, further, any attempt to inspect our own psychological motivations in 
pursuit of an answer to this question would run into layer upon layer of self-deception. 
Right now, we see through a glass darkly; but on the day of judgment, we will understand 
the true nature of our actions clearly enough. 
 For Nicole, the intercourse of self-interested agents mutually pleasuring one 
another—the sexual language is not at all out of place in this kind of Augustinian theory—
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might be deplorable from the moral point of view; but, even as such a society generated 
unequal outcomes, so too the various ties of reciprocal self-interest supported rather than 
undermined a general social cohesion. In this, Nicole was fully in line with Pufendorf’s 
commercial sociability (on which see Hont 2005, 47-50). From one point of view, Nicole’s 
argument looks a bit like what I called the Orthodox view of Hobbes, involving a claim that 
things have been arranged in such a way that acting on prideful and other selfish passions 
turns out not to generate destructive conflict after all. But it isn’t quite the Orthodox view, 
insofar as it is God who has so arranged things, rather than the ‘mortall God’, the Leviathan 
sovereign. If it is God who ensures these outcomes, then we might reflect that the central 
Hobbesian problem of the state of nature isn’t really a problem at all, and the aggregated 
self-interested actions of men don’t contribute towards making life solitary, poor, nasty, 
brutish, or short. There are certainly conspicuously Hobbesian elements in Nicole’s theory: 
a Fallen account of human nature, and, as it happens, a staunch defence of absolutism in 
politics; but we might reflect that it’s actually a pretty non-Hobbesian social theory doing 
the heavy lifting. 
 We get a very different kind of account from a very different kind of Augustinian. ‘As 
arbitrary power is the bane of kings’, Fénelon wrote in Telemachus, his sharp attack on the 
economic and military policy of Louis XIV, ‘so luxury poisons a whole nation’ (Fénelon 
1994, 294). In words that still resonate, ‘All live above their rank and income, some from 
vanity and ostentation, and to display their wealth; others from false shame, and to hide 
their poverty’ (Fénelon 1994, 297). Fénelon argued that running an economy devoted to 
the production and consumption of luxury goods made war more likely, as those without 
access to luxury goods were tempted to use violence to acquire them, and it made that war 
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more dangerous, because ‘these superfluities enervate, intoxicate and torment those who 
possess them’ (110), making them less able to fight (134). Hobbes and Augustine might not 
have agreed about much, but they both thought that the goal of politics was the earthly 
peace. Fénelon’s charge was that any kind of Hobbesian state that permitted luxury 
threatened therefore to fail in its own terms. Far from the Jansenists’ darkly ironic 
celebration of the web of the world market, Fénelon advocated the state’s reconstruction of 
the entire economic sphere. His ideal modern state was presented towards the end of 
Telemachus, with his description of the city of Salente after it had been reorganized by 
Telemachus’s tutor Mentor, who was actually Minerva, the goddess of wisdom, in disguise. 
Reformed Salente is mostly made up of farmers, with the profits from agriculture spent not 
on luxuries but on domestically-manufactured armaments, in order to deter foreign 
aggression (160-72, 294-6). 
The claim is sometimes made that Fénelon was the originator of the Revolutionary 
slogan, ‘liberté, égalité, fraternité’ (on which see Quantin 1989). If the slogan does have 
anything to do with Fénelon, it probably owes to the description of the idyllic pastoral 
community at Bétique that he offers in Telemachus: ‘[T]hey love one another with a 
brotherly affection that nothing can trouble. It is to their contempt for vain riches and 
illusory pleasures that they are indebted for this union, peace, and liberty. They are all free 
and all equal’ (111). The components of the revolutionary triad are all here, to be sure, but 
it’s hard to resist the thought that the attempt to pin the slogan on a seventeenth-century 
Archbishop is at bottom a piece of Catholic counter-revolutionary politics rather than 
anything else. For although Fénelon certainly was a cosmopolitan—one of the best-known 
cosmopolitans in the eighteenth century, in fact—he wasn’t much of an egalitarian at all. 
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His disciple, the chevalier Ramsay (1686-1743), rejected the idea of natural equality in his 
statement of the foundations of political theory ‘according to the principles of the late 
archbishop of Cambray’ (Ramsay 1722, 30-35); and in Fénelon’s description of Reformed 
Salente, the concern was not to abolish the various social classes, or to equalize their living 
standards, but rather to make sure they didn’t interact with one another in ways that 
generated discontent and civil strife. Egalitarian social relations might indeed be feasible in 
primitive, idyllic Bétique, but not for post-luxury Salente. Fénelon was not a Hobbist—
indeed, Ramsay correctly insisted that his political theory had been directed against both 
Hobbes and Machiavelli (among others). But if the theoretical basis of the argument is 
quite different, we can, nevertheless observe certain commonalities between the 
institutional and economic superstructures of the more egalitarian interpretations of 
Hobbes and Fénelonian monarchy, with their depictions of an absolute monarch 
comprehensively structuring social and economic life in order to produce a frugal, 




 Following in Fénelon’s footsteps, Charles-Louis de Secondat, baron de La Brède et de 
Montesquieu (1689-1755) was also troubled by the trajectory of the absolutist monarchy 
in France. Fénelon had written that the monarch had to learn how to ‘slacken the bow of 
power’, and this might be a useful way in to Montesquieu’s political thought, too (Fénelon 
1994, 297). But the argument that he set out in his various writings, culminating in The 
Spirit of the Laws, represented a distinct alternative to the politics of Fénelonian reform. 
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On the one hand, Montesquieu rejected the anti-commercial politics of Fénelon’s Reformed 
Salente. There was no good reason why a modern society should not seek to be a wealthy 
society, and Montesquieu did not share Fénelon’s anxieties about the tendency of luxury to 
generate international conflict (Hont 2006, 404-409). But on the other hand, although 
Montesquieu found much to agree with in Bernard Mandeville’s account of modern social 
and economic life as presented in The Fable of the Bees (Mandeville 1924), he could not 
straightforwardly endorse Mandeville’s description of British politics and society, at least, 
not as a model for France. The English constitution had evolved in a remarkable way that 
preserved liberty amidst the furious clash of political parties and the bustle of commercial 
life, but Montesquieu thought that this happy outcome was the unintended consequence of 
England’s idiosyncratic, violent and unstable political development in the seventeenth 
century, but not one that could be deliberately copied by its neighbor (on which see, e.g. 
Sonenscher 2007, 41-52).  
 In place of Fénelonian monarchy, therefore, Montesquieu offered a new theorization 
of monarchy, in which the power of the monarch had to be limited in order for the liberty of 
the subjects to flourish. A new politics of inequality was absolutely central to this political 
vision. One chapter title early in The Spirit of the Laws is pointedly called, ‘That virtue is 
not the principle of monarchical government’; rather, the principle of monarchy was honor, 
and, according to Montesquieu, the nature of honor ‘is to demand preferences and 
distinctions’ (Montesquieu 1989, 25, 27; for discussion see Krause 2002; cf. Brooke 2017). 
He freely conceded that there was no moral reason as to why aristocrats should receive any 
kind of preference, and that there was something false about honor, ‘but this false honor is 
as useful to the public as the true one would be to the individuals who could have it’ 
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(Montesquieu 1989, 27; see also Sonenscher 2007, 103-104). The trick about honor in a 
monarchical society was that an unintended aggregate by-product of the jealous 
safeguarding of privileges and distinctions at all ranks in society was the preservation and 
buttressing of all of the subjects’ liberties—which included the liberties to engage in 
commerce, thereby to become wealthy, thence to buy one’s way into the honorable ranks of 
the otherwise non-commercial aristocracy. 
 We might think that this kind of defense of the utility of inequality for politics 
required a theoretical rejection of the more egalitarian interpretations of Hobbes, and, 
indeed, it’s probably fair to say that Montesquieu is the most radically unHobbesian 
political theorist in the mainstream of the modern tradition. Montesquieu rejected pretty 
much the entirety of Hobbesian political theory, starting with the celebrated depiction of 
the state of nature. Where for Hobbes, it was certain equalities that obtained in the state of 
nature that made it a state of war, for Montesquieu, by contrast, the equality that prevails in 
a state of nature contributes to it being a peaceful state; but that, ‘As soon as men are in 
society, they lose their feeling of weakness, the equality that was among them ceases, and 
the state of war begins’ (Montesquieu 1989, 7). On the Unorthodox view of Hobbes, we are 
proud in nature, or in ill-constructed commonwealths, but in the well-founded state pride 
is effectively abolished. For Montesquieu, by contrast again, proud behavior is not natural 
but learned, far more at home in the social state than in the state of nature, and, as I’ve 
indicated, the politics of distinction, privilege and hierarchy were central to his conception 
of monarchy. Montesquieu dismantled Hobbes’s system into its component parts, and 
rearranged them in strikingly unHobbesian ways. Managing equality and fear correctly 
were central elements of good Hobbesian politics; whereas Montesquieu drove a wedge 
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between these two, organizing his account of democratic republicanism around the idea of 
virtue as the love of equality, and his account of despotism, the nightmare possible future 
for France, around his notion of fear, or ‘dread’ (crainte).5 
 Montesquieu was convinced that France had to be organized along thoroughly 
inegalitarian lines if her citizens were to prosper in freedom. But how then should we 
characterize the egalitarianism of the democratic republics that he also theorized, whose 
animating principle was virtue, specifically understood as a love of equality? Here I’ll draw 
on the words of Judith Shklar. ‘A tight, cohesive little society of mutually watchful citizens is 
essential to maintain democracy and its spirit of equality’, she wrote:  
Censors must reinforce these informal restrains upon the conduct of adults, but 
nothing is more important than the upbringing of the young, who must obey the old 
in rigidly patriarchal households… The accused criminal must be given the most 
extensive protection, for the life of every citizen is equally precious, but once a 
sentence has been passed, there can be no pardon… [There will be] [s]umptuary 
laws... Since women are treated as articles of consumption in these societies, their 
chastity and domestication are part of the frugal probity of an egalitarian republic. 
Because all relationships are public in a republic, male friendship is realized only 
there… This was Athens at its best and it haunted Montesquieu’s imagination 
(Shklar 1987, 77; also Montesquieu 1989, 104-11).  
The inequalities of status and rights that obtain between men and women prevent us late 
moderns considering this a Non-Intrinsic Egalitarian position, obviously enough. But, if we 
                                                 
5 For a comparison of Hobbes and Montesquieu on ‘fear’ and ‘crainte’, see the first two 
chapters of Robin 2004. 
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were to set gender aside, the logic of this position does seem to me to be Non-Intrinsically 
Egalitarian. Recall the key criteria, as O’Neill set them out. It is vital in Montesquieu’s 
democratic republic for the citizens to avoid stigmatizing differences in status and relations 
of domination. (Montesquieu would deny that the old dominate the young in any 
objectionable way, as this is just a matter of democratic taking turns across the life-cycle.) 
The love of equality that characterizes the republic is essential for the self-respect of all 
citizens, and warns them against servile relationships. And the remarks about male 
friendship remind us what a thoroughly gendered idea the ideal of fraternity—central to 
the politics of Non-Intrinsic Egalitarianism—in practice (almost?) always turns out to be. A 
Montesquieuian democrat would agree that Parfit’s ‘telic’ view of equality is ‘extravagant 
and undermotivated’, as O’Neill suggests; and the democratic republican’s concern for 
equality does not here grow out of a wider theory of justice, as the ‘deontic’ egalitarians 
tend to suggest, but is a distinctively political phenomenon specific to a particular regime-
type.  
 However interested Montesquieu was in describing the nature and structure of the 
democratic republic, this was not a state form he thought that moderns should try to 
create, or to recreate (De Dijn 2013). Modern Europe was not especially hospitable to small 
regimes, and Montesquieu insisted that his democratic republics had to be very small 
indeed, if relations of equality were to endure among the citizens. The Roman Republic 
became large, and that was its undoing—and the subject of Montesquieu’s second book 
(1999). Certainly, Montesquieu’s insistence on the small size of republics helped to create 
the terms of the debate that Jacob T. Levy has described (2006): Hume and the authors of 
the Federalist are the best-known critics of the ‘small republic thesis’, and obviously these 
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concerns deeply informed the constitutional deliberations at Philadelphia. But we might 
just note here that as the republic becomes larger, more representative and more 
commercial, the content of the equality that supposedly stands at its heart gets increasingly 
watered down into a civic ideal, or a bare claim of equality before the law, and it becomes 
hard to see quite how, say, Montesquieu’s ‘love of equality’ is doing any distinctive work in 
the argument any more. The continental, federal republic that James Madison and Thomas 
Jefferson helped to create, for example, was not a Non-Intrinsic Egalitarian one, and not just 




  What might we say about Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778), in light of the story 
that I’ve been setting out in this paper? First, the Non-Intrinsic Egalitarianism of Rousseau’s 
Social Contract and other writings on republican politics is obviously very closely modeled 
on Montesquieu’s democratic republic, complete with the features we might find 
obnoxious: mutual surveillance, the censorship of morals, strictly regulated consumption, 
and the exclusion of women from the political realm. (It will never do, by the way, to say 
that Rousseau was thoughtlessly sexist in the manner of so many of his contemporaries: he 
thought long and hard about gender indeed before coming to his various conclusions—on 
which see Rosenblatt 2002.) We should not be surprised by this. Rousseau might not quite 
have been Montesquieu’s disciple, but he was hugely impressed by and interested in The 
Spirit of the Laws. This was a book that he had read with great care, and from which he had 
made very extensive notes, while working as a secretary for the Dupin household from the 
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later 1740s—and this was also the period which was also his introduction to serious 
thinking about gender, for if M. Claude Dupin had him working on Montesquieu for a 
critical response that he was preparing (1750-51), Mme. Louise Dupin put him to work to 
assemble material for the history of women that she wanted to write (Cranston 1983: 204-
7, 213-15). 
Rousseau’s key disagreement with Montesquieu was presented in the section on 
politics in his educational novel, Emile. After dismissing Grotius as a ‘child of bad faith’ 
(‘enfant de mauvaise foi’), and Hobbes as someone who agreed with Grotius—‘their 
principles are exactly alike’ (‘leurs principes sont exactement semblables’)—he turned his 
attention to Montesquieu: 
The only modern in a position to create this great and useless science was the 
illustrious Montesquieu. But he was careful not to discuss the principles of political 
right. He was content to discuss the positive right of established governments, and 
nothing in the world is more different than these two studies. (Rousseau 1979, 458.) 
We might see Rousseau’s response to Montesquieu as having two central elements, 
represented by his two best-known political texts, the Discourse on the Origin of Inequality 
and the Social Contract. In the first, Rousseau embraces the just-so story genre so popular 
in the eighteenth century, and, confining himself almost entirely to premises that 
Mandeville had accepted, he argued that modern hierarchical societies, whether 
Mandeville’s or Montesquieu’s, must all rest on the violence of the rich against the poor.6 
                                                 
6 On reading Rousseau’s Second Discourse as a Mandevillean reply to Mandeville, see 
Smith, “A Letter to the Authors of the Edinburgh Review” in Smith 1980, esp. pp. 250-51; 
Force 2003, 18-22 and 34-42; and Robertson 2005, 392-6. 
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If the Second Discourse sought to delegitimize existing inegalitarian social and 
political forms, the Social Contract provided the body of political theory that showed what a 
legitimate regime must look like, and in the light of which so much of Montesquieu’s 
presentation became untenable. The subtitle Rousseau eventually settled on for the Social 
Contract, was the ‘principles of political right’, or the ‘principes du droit politique’, exactly 
what he said in Emile that Montesquieu himself had failed to provide, and the moment 
when he made his objection to Montesquieu explicit came in a remark near the end of the 
discussion of democracy as a form of government. He outlined the ‘many things difficult to 
combine’ that a democracy would require, and then observed: 
That is why a famous Author attributed virtue to Republics as their principle; for all 
these conditions could not subsist without virtue: but for want of drawing the 
necessary distinctions, this noble genius often lacked in precision, sometimes in 
clarity, and he failed to see that since Sovereign authority is everywhere the same, 
the same principle must obtain in every well-constituted State, more or less, it is 
true, according to the form of the Government. (Rousseau 1978, 91-2.) 
Monarchies might require less virtue, and democracies more, but virtue, understood in 
terms of a commitment to egalitarian citizenship and love of the patrie, was, for Rousseau, 
the principle of all legitimate political regimes. 
By going back to the principes du droit politique, specifically in the form of a social 
contract argument, we might think that Rousseau was restating a version of Hobbes’s 
theory, or those of the modern natural lawyers, such as Pufendorf. But he firmly resisted 
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the modern natural law school,7 having contempt for those he called the ‘jurisconsults’, 
who provided justifications for the rule of the oligarchs in his native Geneva or for the wars 
that the sovereigns of Europe were ceaselessly waging (Rousseau 1997, 162; also 
Rosenblatt 1997). Indeed, his unpublished essay on ‘The State of War’, Rousseau presented 
his own version of the argument that Hobbesian political thought failed in its own terms, 
for whether or not a state were victorious in modern warfare, modern warfare was itself 
made possible by the Leviathan state, and was so bloody and destructive that it was crazy 
to think that such a Leviathan state could be the answer to the far more mild security 
dilemma of any plausible state of nature (Rousseau 1997, 162-76; see also Tuck 1999, 202-
7). And with reference to the passage from Pufendorf on esteem and price, and against 
universal equality, reproduced earlier, Richard Tuck has remarked (in his unpublished 
2000 Robert P. Benedict Lectures at Boston University) that it ‘captures with remarkable 
clarity the twin objects of Rousseau’s scorn in the 1750s, commercial society in which 
commodities are exchanged on the basis of their price, and the society of social inequality 
in which discriminations are made on the basis of honour.’ Rousseau had more respect for 
Hobbes. Despite what he said about him in Emile, for example, he wrote elsewhere that 
Hobbes had been ‘one of the finest geniuses that ever lived’ (Rousseau 1997, 164). But he 
also considered Hobbes to be an apologist for despotism owing to the chief theoretical gulf 
that separated their two political theories (42-4); for Hobbes sovereignty was necessarily 
representative in nature, and could be alienated or transferred, whereas for Rousseau the 
idea of representing sovereignty at all was absurd (113-16). The only legitimate sovereign 
                                                 
7 Robert Derathé (1950) suggested that Rousseau was basically a member of the modern 
natural law school, but his position was refuted in Wokler (1994). But cf. Douglass 2011. 
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body was the people itself, meeting face to face from time to time in order to ratify 
legislation—and insisting on this allowed Rousseau to deny the inequality that structured 
even more egalitarian interpretations of Hobbes’s political thought, that between the 
subjects and the sovereign. 
Rousseau’s distinctive contribution to this history of Non-Intrinsic Egalitarianism, 
then, is not that he was the first to articulate a Non-Intrinsic Egalitarian point of view. 
Montesquieu had done that with his depiction of democratic republicanism, as had other 
writers in the Utopian tradition before both of them, for whom the overcoming of pride 
was also often considered crucial to the possibility of happy social living together, as in 
More’s Utopia itself (Parrish 2007, 149-53). Rather, Rousseau was the first to tie the 
question of Non-Intrinsic Egalitarianism as it had come up within the modern tradition 
firmly to the question of legitimate politics itself, or the principes du droit politique, to 
argue that the only legitimate regime was a Non-Intrinsically Egalitarian polity—a move 
which Hobbes and Montesquieu, in their different ways, had each declined to make. O’Neill 
is right to say that the concerns of Non-Intrinsic Egalitarians have been ‘dominant themes 
in the history of egalitarian thought, at least since Rousseau’, but insofar as modern 
democratic theory is a series of footnotes to Rousseau’s Social Contract—a view I shall 
assert here but not defend (but see Gaus 1997)—Non-Intrinsic Egalitarianism is intimately 






 Many people who find themselves attracted to egalitarian politics find that they are 
also attracted to cosmopolitanism in ethics, and often enough to more rather than less 
robust accounts of the natural sociability of humankind. (Think of those on the political 
Left, for example, in ordinary life, who dislike those on the right for attributing too much to 
natural selfishness, and discounting the possibilities of altruism.) It’s a very striking feature 
of the period I’ve been discussing in this paper, however, that egalitarianism and 
cosmopolitanism and the thicker accounts of natural sociability never really line up in this 
neat way. The three conspicuously egalitarian views I’ve considered in this paper, whether 
Hobbes on the Unorthodox view, Montesquieu’s presentation of the democratic republic, or 
Rousseau’s political theory, all rest on the denial or the radical attenuation of natural 
sociability, and all reject cosmopolitan ethics at a fairly deep level. Indeed, both 
Montesquieu and Rousseau can plausibly be read as arguing that egalitarian social 
relations are possible only to the extent that the community thinks itself different from and 
superior to its neighbors: amour-propre, after all, must find an outlet somewhere. By 
contrast, those who taught a thicker account of natural sociability, whether Grotius, 
Pufendorf, Barbeyrac or Burlamaqui, were influential apologists for inequality (see 
Rosenblatt 1997); and the most obvious cosmopolitans in the tradition are the 
Augustinians, especially Fénelon.  
The reason for this is that the thinkers I’ve been discussing were extremely nervous 
about how deep the various human practices of comparing ourselves to one another go, 
and how fundamentally the subjective judgments of superiority and inferiority that we so 
frequently make shape our lives and those of the others around us. What Rousseau and 
Hobbes (on the Unorthodox view at least) both suggest is that if you’re serious about doing 
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away with the pride and jealousies and vainglory and stigmatizing inequalities that 
disfigure our social existence, then a very radical and distinctively illiberal political solution 
is required. And if, with Montesquieu and Rousseau, the point of such an egalitarian 
community is that it exercises self-rule, ruling out the option of a monarchical Hobbesian 
sovereign, then the population needs to organize itself in the ways they recommend, 
mutual surveillance, moral censorship, gender segregation and all. Contrary to what so 
many contemporary egalitarians have said so often about their own commitments, in fact, 
for these thinkers equality really does mean a kind of sameness. 
One of the attractions of Non-Intrinsic Egalitarianism is that it is not just an abstract 
ethical theory. Non-Intrinsic Egalitarians need to pay close attention to the social 
institutions and the psychological mechanisms that generate stigma or that undermine self-
respect. And it may be that those who want to place Non-Intrinsic Egalitarianism at the 
heart of their political thinking today might usefully be thinking in a much more 
sociological vein that they have been doing hitherto. What in the contemporary world 
sustains and what undermines a politics of Non-Intrinsic Egalitarianism? The best example 
of a recent society that comes fairly close to the kind of democratic republics Montesquieu 
and Rousseau were thinking of seems to me to be something like Israel in the 1950s and 
1960s, and I think they would both agree on something that seems to me to be 
sociologically plausible, that the egalitarianism and the nationalism and the militarism and 
the antagonism towards her neighbors that characterized Israeli political development in 
this period were all deeply interwoven with and provided mutual support for one another. 
If that isn’t the kind of society Non-Intrinsic Egalitarians today want to work towards, then 
what kinds of institutions might provide adequate functional substitutes for the various 
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practices of nationalism, militarism and xenophobia? Or we might think of European social 
democracy in its classic phase, 1945-73, in which a far more moderately egalitarian 
society—and in many ways not egalitarian at all—was shaped and sustained by factors as 
important and diverse as the Cold War, a remarkable capitalist boom (in French, les trente 
glorieuses), and the strikingly contingent way in which the Second World War helped to 
bring about a far-reaching transformation of the right-hand side of the ideological 
spectrum. Again, if Non-Intrinsic Egalitarianism is to present itself as more than wishful 
thinking for a bygone and deeply imperfect era, it has a lot of thinking to do, but most of it 
on the terrain of political sociology rather than high-level normative theory. 
Rousseau was quite right to criticize Montesquieu for his neglect of the principles of 
political right, but we might conclude that our problem is the opposite of that. Rousseauism 
in its contemporary incarnation as Rawlsian political thought is ubiquitous in many parts of 
the academy, and it pays the closest attention imaginable to the principes du droit 
politique. (For a similar complaint, see Hurley 2006, 152.) What our age needs, by contrast, 
is a revival of the tradition of political thinking associated above all, ironically enough, with 
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